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ARTICLE 
BRASS RINGS AND RED-HEADED 
STEPCHILDREN:  PROTECTING ACTIVE 
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
MICHAEL L. RICH* 
Informants are valued law enforcement tools, and active criminal informants—
criminals who maintain their illicit connections and feed evidence to the police in 
exchange for leniency—are the most prized of all.  Yet society does little to protect active 
criminal informants from the substantial risks inherent in their recruitment and 
cooperation.  As I have explored elsewhere, society’s apathy toward these informants is 
a result of distaste with their disloyalty and a concern that protecting them will 
undermine law enforcement effectiveness.  This Article takes a different tack, however, 
building on existing scholarship on vulnerability and paternalism to argue that society 
has a duty to protect some vulnerable informant interests.  In particular, I assess 
informant vulnerabilities against accepted societal norms to determine which 
informants deserve greatest protection and balance informant autonomy interests 
against informant interests in avoiding harm. 
Against this backdrop, I propose safeguards to protect the vulnerable safety and 
autonomy interests of active criminal informants that most deserve society’s protection 
while minimally interfering with law enforcement effectiveness.  The proposals include:  
requiring court approval for the use of particularly vulnerable active informants and 
prosecutorial consent for the use of all others; providing training for informants and 
law enforcement agents in minimizing the risks of harm from cooperation; and folding 
informants into existing workers’ compensation schemes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Informants are critical law enforcement tools,1 and the active 
informant, i.e., one who will continue to acquire information for the 
police while maintaining her criminal connections, is the “brass 
ring” for an agent.2  Her continuing connections to the criminal 
underworld allow for a number of benefits to law enforcement, 
including the efficient and effective infiltration of criminal 
organizations and the collection of damning evidence against them, 
all at a diminished cost to law enforcement.3  But despite their 
importance, society treats informants generally, and criminal 
informants specifically,4 like red-headed stepchildren.5  Active 
criminal informants are vulnerable to substantial physical, social, and 
moral harm,6 yet society does little to ensure their safety.7  Moreover, 
informant recruitment is inherently coercive, and there are no 
safeguards to ensure that informants agree voluntarily to cooperate.8  
Finally, many active criminal informants possess individual 
characteristics, such as youth, mental illness, and drug addiction, that 
make them particularly vulnerable to coercion and other harm,9 but 
few jurisdictions impose any restrictions on who the police may 
recruit to cooperate.10 
                                                          
 1. See JOHN MADINGER, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT:  LAW ENFORCEMENT’S MOST 
VALUABLE TOOL 27 (2000) (noting “the tremendous usefulness of informants in 
resolving crimes”); STEPHEN L. MALLORY, INFORMANTS:  DEVELOPMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT, at ix (2000) (“After 24 years in the profession of drug enforcement, 
extensive training, and continuous education, I have reached the same conclusion as 
many criminal investigators regarding informants—successful investigations are 
dependent on informant development.”); CARMINE J. MOTTO & DALE L. JUNE, 
UNDERCOVER 13 (2d ed. 2000) (“Informants are a very necessary part of police work 
and most agencies would be at a loss to operate without them.”); see also DELORES 
JONES-BROWN & JON M. SHANE, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF 
THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN NEW JERSEY 3 (2011) [hereinafter ACLU 
STUDY] (“In some law enforcement agencies, the research revealed a substantial use 
of information from CIs, rather than independent police work, as part of the routine 
investigation of drug activity.”).  
 2. MADINGER, supra note 1, at 29. 
 3. See infra Part I.A (describing how law enforcement uses criminal informants). 
 4. Criminal informants are those informants that cooperate with police in 
exchange for leniency, often motivated by the fear of incarceration.  MADINGER, supra 
note 1, at 51. 
 5. In common parlance, a red-headed stepchild is one “who is neglected, 
mistreated or unwanted.”  Michael Quinion, Red-Headed Stepchild, WORLD WIDE 
WORDS (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-red2.htm. 
 6. See infra Part III.A.1 (illustrating the unique societal and situational 
vulnerabilities of criminal informants). 
 7. See infra Part V (explaining the current protections criminal informants 
receive and the limitations of such protections). 
 8. See infra Part III.A.3 (noting how coercion, usually stemming from fear of 
criminal sanctions, can be used to recruit criminal informants). 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. See infra Part V.B (detailing the inadequate protections provided to criminal 
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Why would society fail to protect such valuable law enforcement 
assets?  First, informants are treated poorly because, to put it bluntly, 
society dislikes them.11  By assisting the police in apprehending their 
associates and friends, informants commit the egregious sin of 
betrayal.12  The resulting disdain is heightened with respect to 
criminal informants because they are criminals who betray others for 
the purely selfish purpose of obtaining leniency.13  Second, though 
active criminal informants are valuable to police, they are often 
fungible.14  Though the criminal connections of the low-level 
criminals who frequently become informants are useful, many others 
typically share these criminal connections.15  Moreover, the benefits 
of cooperating with the police are substantial enough to entice a 
continuous stream of criminals to cooperate, notwithstanding the 
risks.16 
Though society’s disdain for informants is understandable, the 
failure to protect them is unjustified.  Society has a widely-accepted 
obligation to protect its most vulnerable members,17 and informants 
                                                          
informants in their dealings with agents). 
 11. See, e.g., MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 13 (“‘Rat,’ ‘squeal,’ ‘stool,’ ‘canary,’ 
‘fink,’ ‘snitch,’ ‘narc,’ and variations of these words are only a few of the less-than[-
]respectful terms that have been used to designate one who gives information to 
enforcement or investigative agencies.”). 
 12. See Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 
1257, 1269 (2011) (explaining that for an informant to have knowledge of criminal 
activity, the informant must have earned the trust of the criminal, a trust the 
informant violates); Michael L. Rich, Lessons of Disloyalty in the World of Criminal 
Informants, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16–17), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722597 (discussing how members of society, especially 
in high crime neighborhoods, possess an unfavorable view of informants’ breaches of 
loyalty). 
 13. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING:  CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION 
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 39 (2009) (establishing that the criminal system is relatively 
unsympathetic toward criminal offenders); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats:  
Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2003) (asserting 
that criminal informants are like Judas, but are paid in leniency rather than money). 
 14. On the other hand, high-level criminal informants, such as those glamorized 
in popular culture, are difficult, if not impossible, to replace.  See, e.g., GOODFELLAS 
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1990) (telling the fictionalized story of Henry Hill, a former 
mobster who became a government informant); THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros. 
Pictures 2009) (recounting the experience of Mark Whitacre, an executive at Archer 
Daniels Midland, who provided the FBI with information about his employer’s 
criminal price-fixing scheme).  For this reason, witness protection programs are 
tailored to protect them.  See infra Part V.A (detailing the components of witness 
protection programs). 
 15. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 8–10 (describing the utility of informant 
connections). 
 16. Estimates have placed the number of informants who are active at any given 
time in the hundreds of thousands.  See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching:  The 
Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 657 (2004). 
 17. See infra Part II.A (describing the political, legal, and philosophical schools of 
thought that support society’s duty to protect the vulnerable).  The assertion that 
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are often quite vulnerable.18  This duty is enhanced when an 
individual’s vulnerabilities are the result of her engagement in 
socially-beneficial activities; the active criminal informant’s 
cooperation falls into that category.19  It is easy to muster the political 
will to protect those who are vulnerable and sympathetic, but society 
also must protect those who, like criminal informants, are repugnant 
to the majority.20 
But to identify active criminal informants as vulnerable and to 
recognize a normative obligation to protect them raises more 
questions:  Does society have a duty to protect all vulnerable 
informant interests?  Is there a hierarchy among interests such that 
society has a greater duty to protect some more than others?  What 
should happen when protecting one informant interest endangers 
another?  In particular, to what extent should society impinge on the 
autonomy interests of an informant in order to protect her safety 
interests?  Finally, if there is a duty to protect some informant 
interests, how should society satisfy that duty? 
In answering these questions, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part 
I briefly describes the role of the active criminal informant in the 
criminal justice system.  Part II explores society’s duty to protect the 
vulnerable and examines societal norms suggesting that the 
                                                          
society has a duty to protect the vulnerable must be distinguished from the position 
that government has such a duty.  The concept of a governmental duty, a special 
application of societal duties, was rejected by the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 18. Interestingly, the informants who receive the greatest amount of media 
attention are often those who are the least vulnerable.  A recent example of this 
focused media attention is the publicity surrounding the capture of Whitey Bulger, a 
Boston gangster and FBI informant who cannot be fairly described as vulnerable.  See 
Adam Nagourney & Abby Goodnough, Long Elusive, Irish Mob Legend Ended Up a 
California Recluse, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A1.  Bulger used his status as an FBI 
informant as a cover for his commission of a wide range of crimes over more than a 
decade, including drug trafficking, extortion, and murder.  See generally United States 
v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 175–315 (D. Mass. 1999) (recounting at length 
findings of fact regarding Bulger’s time as an FBI informant), rev’d in part sub nom. 
United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000).  Bulger’s relationship with his 
FBI handler, John J. Connolly, Jr., led to Connolly’s conviction on corruption 
charges.  See Fox Butterfield, Ex-F.B.I. Agent Sentenced for Helping Mob Leaders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A22.  The media attention paid to the few informants, like 
Bulger, who effectively game the informant system to their benefit, likely makes 
protection of the vast majority of informants even less popular. 
 19. See infra Part III.B (illustrating the personal characteristics of criminal 
informants that may make them even more vulnerable). 
 20. For this reason, one of the goals of the Bill of Rights was to fulfill society’s 
obligation to protect unpopular and minority interests from oppression by the 
majority.  See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501 (1944) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“The founders of our federal government were too close to oppressions 
and persecutions of the unorthodox, the unpopular, and the less influential, to trust 
even elected representatives with unlimited powers of control over the individual.”). 
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vulnerabilities that result from an individual’s immutable 
characteristics or socially-beneficial activities are entitled to the 
greatest protection.  Part III applies the observations of Part II to the 
specific case of the active criminal informant and identifies those 
vulnerabilities that are most deserving of protection.  Part IV 
reconciles the informant’s safety and autonomy interests with 
reference to the rich literature on paternalism and argues for a “soft” 
paternalistic approach that emphasizes the importance of informed 
decision-making by the informant.  Part V reviews existing legal 
doctrines and statutory schemes and concludes that they provide 
insufficient protection for vulnerable informant interests.  Finally, 
Part VI proposes legislative and law enforcement policy changes to 
provide appropriate protections for active criminal informants.  
These include requiring court approval for the use of particularly 
vulnerable informants and prosecutorial consent for the use of all 
others, providing training for informants and law enforcement agents 
to minimize the risk of harm to informants, and encouraging law 
enforcement to include informants in the scope of existing workers’ 
compensation schemes. 
I. ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
The term “informant” refers broadly to any civilian who provides 
information to the police.21  This Article limits its discussion to active 
criminal informants for three reasons.  First, the heterogeneity of 
informants makes it impossible to discuss their varied interests 
meaningfully and comprehensively.22  Second, among all informants 
active criminal informants are both numerous and the “most prized 
by law enforcement.”23  Third, active criminal informants engage in 
                                                          
 21. Michael L. Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on the 
Police-Informant Relationship, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 689 (2010). 
 22. Informants may be referred to by a wide range of cultural tropes, such as 
“jailhouse snitches,” “criminal accomplices,” “concerned citizens,” and “innocent 
eyewitnesses.”  Id. at 689–90. 
 23. MADINGER, supra note 1, at 28.  No hard data exists to detail the precise 
extent of informant usage, but estimates place the number of active informants at 
any given time in the hundreds of thousands.  Natapoff, supra note 16, at 657.  Of 
these, a majority of them are likely to be criminal informants, as leniency is the most 
common incentive used in the recruitment of informants.  MADINGER, supra note 1, 
at 51; see JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:  LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 112 (3d ed. 1994) (“To maintain an informant network, police 
must pay off each informer, usually by arranging for a reduction of charge or 
sentence or by not acting as a complainant . . . .”).  Police literature suggests that 
many informants take an active role in investigations.  See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 3 
(discussing the importance of informants “who can conduct surveillance, testify in 
court, identify potential targets, initiate contact with targets, and provide law 
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particularly risky activity, both in terms of the threat of physical injury 
should they be discovered and the potential for moral harm as they 
continue to associate with criminals and engage in crime.24 
Active criminal informants are distinguished from other 
informants by three characteristics.25  First, an active criminal 
informant is a criminal.  Second, an active criminal informant 
cooperates with law enforcement in exchange for some sort of 
leniency with respect to her criminal activity, such as a reduction in 
sentence or a decision not to prosecute.  Third, an active criminal 
informant provides information to the police on an ongoing basis by 
maintaining her existing criminal connections and developing new 
ones.26 
A. Use of Active Criminal Informants 
Active criminal informants are most useful to law enforcement 
because the threat of criminal prosecution makes them highly 
motivated in their pursuit of evidence against others,27 and their 
criminal connections permit law enforcement to infiltrate illicit 
organizations more efficiently and effectively.28  Undercover law 
enforcement agents must devote substantial time and resources to 
infiltrating criminal organizations while exposing themselves to 
significant risk; even then, they are not always successful.29  An active 
criminal informant can expedite that process significantly by 
                                                          
enforcement with this information, or introduce an undercover agent to these 
targets”). 
 24. See infra Part III (expanding on the vulnerabilities of and risks to criminal 
informants). 
 25. There is no standard terminology used to refer to different kinds of 
informants.  Thus, the term “active criminal informant” is not a term of art, but 
merely descriptive.  See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 28 (referring to an “active 
informant” as one who “provide[s] information while remaining in position in the 
criminal setting”).  Moreover, the term “snitch” will be avoided because of the 
unhelpful pejorative implications of the word.  See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 
1–2) (discussing how the term “snitch” plays into a belief from childhood that being 
a “tattle-tale” is wrong). 
 26. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 28–29 (noting that an informant may have to 
commit crimes on the orders of agents).  This characteristic distinguishes the active 
criminal informant from the cooperator whose assistance is limited to testifying for 
the government at trial or providing previously-obtained information to the police.  
See generally Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1992) (discussing cooperation agreements involving the exchange of 
leniency for information or testimony). 
 27. See Rich, supra note 21, at 694 (indicating that when an informant does not 
have a specialized motivational interest, police or prosecutors can generally leverage 
criminal charges or lengthy prison sentences). 
 28. MALLORY, supra note 1, at 3–4, 9–10. 
 29. Id. at 9–10. 
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vouching for the agent.30  In some cases, these informants can remove 
the need for undercover work entirely by continuing their 
involvement in the organization and obtaining evidence of criminal 
activity directly.31  They also assist law enforcement by letting police 
know about crimes that may never have been detected otherwise and 
by using their knowledge of criminal communities to direct police 
investigations to higher-value targets.32 
Because active criminal informants are most useful in helping 
police infiltrate criminal conspiracies and detect vice crimes, they 
have historically been of particular importance in the areas of drug 
enforcement and organized crime.33  Active criminal informants are 
also increasingly used in counterterrorism efforts and white-collar 
investigations.34  Nonetheless, active criminal informants are 
employed to investigate all types of crime.35  Active criminal 
informants are a cross-section of criminals36:  many have mental 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 77; MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 57. 
 31. MALLORY, supra note 1, at 10. 
 32. Id. at 8, 13–14. 
 33. See MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
12 (2d ed. 1968) (“The short summary of the stated value of the informer from the 
prosecution point of view is that he is almost indispensable in narcotics cases.  With 
this we agree . . . .”); ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting that law enforcement 
agencies regularly use informants for drug crimes); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE 
INVESTIGATORS:  MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 76 (1978) (“[W]ithout an 
informant, few cases can be made at all, and thus the DEA can monitor its agents’ 
performance by examining case output or undercover buys . . . .”). 
 34. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at xi (noting the importance of informants in 
combating “[r]ising terrorist activity” and “the emerging economic crime wave”); 
NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 30, 154 (explaining that informants brought down white 
collar criminals such as Kenneth Lay and that the Department of Justice has 
increasingly relied on criminal informants in its white collar division); Wadie E. Said, 
The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 688 (2010) (noting the rising use of 
confidential informants in criminal terrorism prosecutions since September 11, 
2001). 
 35. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 33, at 14 (“The fact is that the informer is 
valuable to the police in practically every spectrum of crime.”); NATAPOFF, supra note 
13, at 26 (explaining the extremes of informants from high-level corporate 
executives to drug addicts on street corners).  That they are considered to be the 
most valuable informants does not mean that the use of active criminal informants 
does not have its pitfalls for law enforcement.  See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 31–38 
(detailing some of the problems for law enforcement caused by informants, 
including allowing criminals to walk free, enhancing criminality, flouting “the worse 
the crime, the worse the punishment” rule, exacerbating racial disparities, allowing 
informants to control investigations, corruption, and informant misconduct).  
However, even critics of widespread informant use recognize their utility.  See id. at 
29–31 (explaining how informants enable law enforcement to infiltrate particular 
criminal rings and reduce law enforcement costs). 
 36. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that no ban exists on using 
juvenile informants).  For an in-depth discussion of the use of juvenile informants, 
see generally Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage?  Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” 
on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009) (discussing the 
ambivalence American society has for juveniles within the criminal justice realm). 
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health problems, suffer from mental deficiencies, or are drug 
addicts.37  Many criminal informants are on the lower rungs of the 
criminal ladder, and law enforcement offers them leniency only if 
they can deliver evidence against more “valuable” targets.38 
Along with being the most useful of informants to law 
enforcement, active criminal informants also engage in the most risky 
activity.39  For instance, the prototypical active criminal informant in 
the drug context arranges to purchase contraband from another 
criminal so that police can apprehend the seller.40  In other cases, the 
informant may wear a wire, join subversive organizations, or even 
engage in a sexual relationship with a target.41  These activities are 
distinct from other informant activity:  they typically require the 
active criminal informant to be outside of police protection and in 
proximity to the target of the investigation, risking immediate and 
violent retribution should the informant’s cooperation be 
discovered.42  Moreover, those low-level informants seeking evidence 
against “big fish” may find themselves out of their depth, involving 
targets who are more serious criminals and prone to violence.43 
                                                          
 37. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 51–53 (detailing a community survey in 
which drug-addicted respondents and those with mental health issues reported 
working as informants).  Though these informants pose additional risks for the 
police, their use is viewed as inevitable because of the frequency of mental health 
and drug abuse problems among criminals.  See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 186–90 
(elaborating on the use of addicts and those with mental health problems as 
informants); MALLORY, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing “restricted use informants,” 
including juveniles and drug addicts). 
 38. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are 
Not Innocents:  Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the 
Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 556 (2009) (explaining how “big fish” (the 
criminal organizers) can implicate more “little fish” (agents of the crime) but “little 
fish” can deliver the more valuable “big fish”). 
 39. This is not to say that informants who only provide information or testify on 
behalf of the government are not subject to harm.  See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 
300, 308 (1967) (noting the importance of anonymity to all informants who fear 
harm to themselves and their family). 
 40. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 77 (listing purchasing contraband as one of the 
common tasks of informants); MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 57 (describing how an 
informant can set up a “buy-bust” by paying for drugs with marked money). 
 41. Rich, supra note 21, at 691. 
 42. See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
the informant’s “usual risk of being beaten up or for that matter bumped off by a 
drug dealer with whom one is negotiating a purchase or sale of drugs in the hope of 
obtaining lenient treatment from the government”); Susan S. Kuo, Official 
Indiscretions:  Considering Sex Bargains with Government Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1643, 1661–62 (2005) (discussing the risks of physical harm to informants). 
 43. See, e.g., ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 11 (“[M]ere motor vehicle traffic 
violators were used in some cases to infiltrate criminal enterprises run by interstate 
drug traffickers.”); Rich, supra note 21, at 681–83 (detailing the case of Rachel 
Morningstar Hoffman, a confidential informant and low-level marijuana dealer who 
was killed during the purchase of ecstasy, cocaine, and a handgun—a transaction 
that she arranged at the instruction of her police handlers). 
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B. Recruitment of Criminal Informants 
Recruitment of active criminal informants typically occurs without 
the oversight of courts or the involvement of defense counsel.44  
Police attempt to recruit informants immediately after, or sometimes 
in lieu of, their arrest, as this is when the potential informant is most 
afraid of jail time and thus most likely to agree to cooperate.45  To 
best utilize an arrestee’s fear of punishment as an incentive to 
cooperate, police emphasize the maximum penalties that the 
potential informant might face and suggest that cooperation is her 
only option to avoid those penalties.46  In some cases, police may even 
bluff by threatening charges for which there is insufficient evidence 
to convict.47  Because defense counsel may discourage a potential 
informant from cooperating or try to extract a better bargain for her 
client, police will sometimes discourage their involvement.48  The 
agreements between police and informants also are often informal 
and rarely memorialized in writing.49 
In some cases, prosecutors negotiate with the potential informants 
instead of the police as police are limited in what they can deliver to 
an informant.  When a potential informant has just been arrested and 
no charges have been filed, police can truthfully promise not to 
disclose her most recent crime to the prosecutor if she cooperates.50  
But the police typically lack the authority to bind prosecutors,51 so the 
                                                          
 44. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 16 (contrasting the constitutional protections 
that criminal defendants receive to the lack of protections informants receive). 
 45. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 12, 54 (discussing the street-level and arrest-
related recruitment of informants); Rich, supra note 21, at 694 (stressing the 
uncertainty about consequences that leads arrestees to be likely to agree to 
cooperate). 
 46. See Rich, supra note 21, at 696 (explaining that officers emphasize the 
maximum penalties to secure informants); see also ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 10 
(“Police ‘squeeze’ criminal defendants by threatening them with additional charges 
or counts related to their own cases if they do not ‘cooperate’ by becoming 
[informants].”). 
 47. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 52–53 (reporting that the police threaten to 
plant incriminating evidence on witnesses or charge them with crimes like 
obstruction of justice or hindering prosecution if such witnesses fail to provide or 
gather evidence for the police); Rich, supra note 21, at 696 (noting that the police 
will discourage defendants from speaking to attorneys). 
 48. Rich, supra note 21, at 696. 
 49. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that many agreements are verbal 
and may be written down later); see also ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining 
that while written cooperation agreements are required by New Jersey guidelines, the 
mandate is rarely followed). 
 50. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 18–19 (asserting that the police may bluff to 
convince a potential informant to cooperate). 
 51. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 780 n.140 (2003) (collecting cases); see also Joaquin J. 
Alemany, Comment, United States Contracts with Informants:  An Illusory Promise?, 33 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 251, 260–66 (2002) (same).  But see United States v. Carrillo, 
RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:14 PM 
2012] PROTECTING ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 1443 
relevant prosecutor must be involved if the informant is to negotiate 
a valid and binding cooperation agreement for leniency on charges 
that are either under investigation or have already been filed.  If the 
negotiations involve pending charges, the potential informant has a 
constitutional right to have counsel involved.52  However, the right to 
counsel typically does not attach until formal charges are brought 
against a potential informant.53  Thus, prosecutors are free to 
negotiate cooperation agreements with potential informants without 
providing them with an opportunity to consult with counsel.54 
Even where an informant has negotiated with a government 
representative who has the authority to bind the State, cooperation 
agreements typically vest substantial discretion in government agents 
to determine whether the informant has met her obligations and is 
thus entitled to the promised leniency.55  Moreover, because a 
prosecutor cannot bind a court’s sentencing discretion, the offered 
leniency is usually limited to a promise to convey the fact of the 
informant’s cooperation to the sentencing tribunal and to seek a 
                                                          
709 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding dismissal of drug charges based on a 
finding that the defendant fulfilled the terms of cooperation agreement with DEA 
agents, who promised that he would not be prosecuted).  Occasionally, courts find 
that the apparent authorization by a government agent of an informant’s criminal 
activity is a defense to charges arising from that activity.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant could claim 
entrapment by estoppel if he reasonably relied on representations by a government 
agent that his criminal activity was authorized as part of a cooperation agreement). 
 52. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (recognizing that denying 
access to counsel before trial may be extremely damaging to the fate of the accused). 
 53. See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach at pre-indictment plea 
negotiations). 
 54. Though some prosecutors’ offices may have formal or informal policies 
requiring the presence of counsel, it is implausible that, in the absence of some 
constitutional or statutory prohibition, some prosecutors would not meet with 
potential informants outside of the presence of defense counsel.  See id. (upholding 
pre-indictment negotiations where counsel was not present). 
 55. For instance, the United States Sentencing Guidelines give the prosecutor 
discretion to decide whether to file a motion for a downward departure in light of 
the defendant’s “substantial assistance” to the government, bounded only by 
constitutional limitations.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2011); see 
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 (1992) (asserting that a court may 
examine the substantial assistance motion if the refusal implicates the Constitution).  
Similarly, the requirements of most cooperation agreements specify only that the 
informants must render “full cooperation” or its equivalent to receive leniency.  See 
Hughes, supra note 26, at 47 (citing United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352, 353 (8th 
Cir. 1986)) (noting the requirement of full cooperation from the defendant for 
immunity).  Whether informants have met that standard is the subject of a steady 
stream of litigation that rarely ends in the informant’s favor.  See Ian Weinstein, 
Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 589–91 (1999) (examining the 
varying interpretations courts have used to address substantial assistance motions, 
each of which generally favors the government). 
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lower sentence.56  Should the court disagree with the prosecutor’s 
recommendation or adjudge the informant’s cooperation 
insufficient, the informant is left with little recourse.57 
C. Disdain for Active Criminal Informants 
Though active criminal informants play a crucial role in law 
enforcement, they are subject to widespread societal disdain.  In 
society’s eyes, the first mark against them is that they are criminals.  
By engaging in criminal activity, the informant becomes a 
marginalized “other” whose claims on basic rights, such as housing, 
employment, voting, and sustenance, are lost or severely curtailed.58  
This demonization of the criminal is reinforced by the 
sensationalizing of crime in the news media and popular culture.59  
The distaste is compounded in the case of the criminal informant 
because she betrays her criminal compatriots when she cooperates 
with the police and does so for selfish reasons.60  She is, in common 
parlance, a “snitch,” a “squealer,” and a “rat.”61  This perception of 
the informant as disloyal is particularly strong in the high-crime 
communities that are most marginalized from mainstream society 
and in which active criminal informants are likely to live.62 
                                                          
 56. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 588, 591–92 (explaining that defendants are 
held to their agreements but the decision to mitigate sentences lies ultimately within 
the court’s discretion). 
 57. See id. at 592 (emphasizing that the court’s decision on whether to mitigate 
the sentence is unreviewable). 
 58. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Confronting 
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 489–94 (2010) (explaining the 
collateral consequences for individuals in the U.S. with criminal convictions in 
housing, voting, employment, and public benefits); see also Alec C. Ewald, “Civil 
Death”:  The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (describing John Locke’s view that “one who commits a 
crime forfeits his right to participate in the political process—if not his rights to 
property and person”). 
 59. See Craig Haney, Media Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 
689, 729 (2009) (“[B]eyond reinforcing the master crime narrative by 
individualizing and decontextualizing crime, media criminology consistently 
dehumanizes and demonizes perpetrators and effectively exoticizes their 
criminality.”); Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 
395 (“The news media keeps up a steady drumbeat of crime⎯‘if it bleeds, it 
leads’⎯and portrays criminal defendants as unworthy and less than human.”). 
 60. See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 13–17) (discussing how society views 
the accomplice-informant negatively because of perceived self-serving motives). 
 61. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 570 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (listing cultural terminology used to describe informants to demonstrate 
that these individuals offend social values of loyalty and personal privacy). 
 62. For instance, the perception of informant disloyalty lies at the heart of the 
“Stop Snitching” movement, which discourages even law-abiding citizens in these 
communities to cooperate with the police.  Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 17–
28). 
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The broader societal disdain of criminal informants is magnified 
within the law enforcement community, which generally views 
informants “with aversion and nauseous disdain.”63  Police officers 
have such a well-developed sense of loyalty that they punish severely 
those officers who are perceived to be disloyal.64  It is thus 
unsurprising that in handling informants, police are cautioned to 
mask their distaste of the informant’s disloyalty.65  Both police and 
prosecutors frequently speak of the informant as being, at best, a 
“necessary evil.”66  Indeed, a popular aphorism used frequently by 
prosecutors to explain to juries their use of criminal informants as 
witnesses is instructive of the law enforcement perspective on 
criminal informants:  “[i]f you are going to try the devil, you have to 
go to hell to get your witnesses.”67 
                                                          
 63. Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and 
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951).  This background distaste for the 
informant does not mean that police officers and prosecutors never come to like 
individual informants with whom they deal on a personal level.  Indeed, police are 
cautioned for good reason against becoming too friendly with their informants, 
particularly those of the opposite sex.  See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 185–86 
(discussing the risks of informants becoming romantically involved with their 
contacts).  Rather, the assertion is that active criminal informants specifically are 
disliked as a class by prosecutors and police officers, even though individual 
government agents may develop a personal affinity for individual informants. 
 64. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias 
and Motive to Lie:  A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 256–61 
(1998) (discussing the ostracism, retaliation, and physical violence suffered by police 
who report wrongdoing by other officers); see also MALLORY, supra note 1, at 17 
(“This code of silence is even upheld in many law enforcement entities.  Covering 
for a partner or not disclosing illegal activity is all too common in the police 
community.”). 
 65. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 28 (cautioning that “[r]eferring to informants 
as damn snitches, scum bags, rats, etc. . . . are not very effective methods to obtain 
accurate information”); MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 1, at 58–59 (“It has been said a 
thousand ways.  Police officers should handle informants with respect and refrain 
from using the word ‘informer’, ‘squeal’, ‘rat’, ‘narc’, ‘stool’ or other similar 
derogatory descriptions.”). 
 66. MALLORY, supra note 1, at x; see John Monk, Did Freeing Accused Killer Lead to 
Murder?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 7, 2011, at B2 (quoting a prosecutor who 
described releasing one criminal to catch another as “a dirty business”). 
 67. This maxim comes in many forms, all of which essentially equate criminal 
informants to denizens of hell.  See, e.g., Belisle v. State, 11 So. 3d 256, 303 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2007) (quoting a prosecutor’s opening statement in which he stated:  
“[u]nfortunately, sometimes if you want to get the devil, you’ve gotta go to hell for 
witnesses”); Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 207 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting a 
prosecutor for the aphorism:  “[c]rime conceived in hell will not have any angels as 
witnesses”); Monk, supra note 66 (quoting a prosecutor who said, “[w]hen you want 
to convict the devil, sometimes you got to go to hell to get the witnesses”). 
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II. PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE 
A. Society’s General Duty to Protect the Vulnerable 
The protection of the vulnerable is one of the principal duties of 
society and a foundational goal of the legal system.68  Support for the 
existence of this duty is found in various schools of political, legal, 
and philosophical thought.  Natural law, for instance, includes an 
individual’s right to life, liberty, and security and imposes an 
obligation on governments to protect those rights.69  Social contract 
theory teaches that the government takes on the duty to protect its 
citizens in exchange for the citizen’s surrender of some measure of 
their inherent freedom.70  Social justice theory instructs that the 
government must protect the liberty of all citizens and must protect 
that liberty fairly, regardless of an individual’s social or political 
status.71  From the legal standpoint, society’s duty to protect the 
vulnerable is often conceived as the State’s parens patriae power and 
obligation to protect the vulnerable, such as children and the 
mentally ill.72 
Those arguing for changes in positive law to protect various sub-
groups often cite society’s duty to protect the vulnerable to justify 
their efforts.  Children’s advocates argue for the expansion of legal 
doctrines and the enactment of legislation to protect children on the 
ground that they are among the most vulnerable members of 
                                                          
 68. See Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (2010) 
(discussing the government’s duty to protect the vulnerable); Michael L. Rustad & 
Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to Redress Public Health Epidemics, 
14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 373 (2011) (same). 
 69. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl. para. 
3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (asserting that human rights should be 
protected by the law); see also Laura Moranchek Hussain, Note, Enforcing the Treaty 
Rights of Aliens, 117 YALE L.J. 680, 720 (2008) (noting that international recognition 
of human rights goes beyond U.S. constitutional protections for aliens and are 
inherent in personhood). 
 70. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 170 (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann eds., 
Thoemmes Continuum 2003) (1651) (arguing that an individual must cede control 
to the sovereign for stability). 
 71. See SAM SOURYAL, ETHICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH 189–91 
(3d ed. 2003) (detailing John Rawls’s ethical theory, which is based on a 
presumption of equality); Janet Thompson Jackson, What is Property?  Property Is Theft:  
The Lack of Social Justice in U.S. Eminent Domain Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 63, 74–75 
(2010) (explaining John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, which perceives fairness as a 
balancing of claims). 
 72. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the 
Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 322 (2010) (noting that the parens patriae power is 
most commonly utilized to separate a child from his parent); Elizabeth Weeks 
Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 
1370–71 (2010) (explaining parens patriae for children and other legally incompetent 
persons). 
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society.73  Arguments for expanded protection of the mentally and 
physically disabled also rely on the notion that their vulnerability 
gives rise to enhanced societal duties.74  Similar arguments are used to 
advocate on behalf of legal protections for the elderly75 and for 
various immigrant groups.76  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the protection of vulnerable groups is a legitimate 
governmental interest in a variety of contexts.77 
B. Defining Vulnerability 
Though the term “vulnerable” is often used to describe those we 
normatively wish to protect, it is rarely clearly defined.78  As used 
herein, a specific instance of an individual’s vulnerability is defined 
by two variables.  One must identify first what the individual is 
vulnerable to.79  In other words, to what harm is the individual 
susceptible?  The harm can be physical, but can also involve less 
tangible “interests,” such as one’s psychological or economic well-
being.80  Additionally, vulnerability is defined by whom the individual 
is vulnerable to.81  Put another way, who, through their action or 
                                                          
 73. Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood:  Legal Strategies to 
Combat the Use of Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 67, 88 (2007); 
Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, Before It’s Too Late:  Neuropsychological 
Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for Law and Social Policy, 33 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 561, 577 (2000). 
 74. See Pamela Fadem et al., Attitudes of People with Disabilities Toward Physician-
Assisted Suicide Legislation:  Broadening the Dialogue, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 977, 
980–81 (2003) (detailing two Supreme Court cases where people with disabilities are 
recognized as an at-risk group). 
 75. See Arthur Meirson, Note, Prosecuting Elder Abuse:  Setting the Gold Standard in 
the Golden State, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 432 (2008) (arguing that elder populations 
should be protected because of their unique vulnerability). 
 76. See Alexander Betts, Soft Law and the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants, 24 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 533, 535 (2010) (explaining that migrant groups are particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation). 
 77. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (upholding a 
ban on assisted suicide by relying, in part, on a governmental interest in protecting 
vulnerable groups, including the poor, the elderly, and the disabled, from coercion, 
prejudice, and societal indifference); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) 
(recognizing that “‘the state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers 
in providing care to its citizens who are unable . . . to care for themselves’” (quoting 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979))); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379, 394–95 (1937) (holding that freedom of contract could be restricted in 
order to protect vulnerable groups). 
 78. See, e.g., Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human 
Subject Research, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 12 (2009) (criticizing the imprecise use of 
the term “vulnerability” in human subject protection regulations). 
 79. ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE:  A REANALYSIS OF OUR 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 112 (1985). 
 80. The specific question of what counts as an individual’s “interest” such that it 
might be deserving of protection is itself a normative question.  Id. at 111. 
 81. Id. at 112. 
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inaction, can cause the individual the harm to which she is 
susceptible? 
This bifurcated definition of vulnerability suggests two observations 
relevant to the criminal informants.  First, an individual is vulnerable 
both to a person affirmatively threatening her with harm as well as to 
a person capable of protecting her from harm.82  For instance, the 
victim of a mugging is vulnerable both to the mugger who can cause 
her injury by firing his gun and to the passerby who witnesses the 
crime and could prevent the harm by alerting the police.  Second, 
this definition means that all people are vulnerable in many ways, in 
that every person is susceptible to harm from the action or inaction 
of a variety of people.83  For example, one person may be vulnerable 
simultaneously to, inter alia, emotional injury from her loved ones, 
physical injury from the drivers of nearby vehicles or passing 
pedestrians, and economic injury from her employer or the manager 
of her investments. 
C. Identifying the Vulnerabilities Entitled to Society’s Protection 
If every person is vulnerable, then it is both unfeasible and 
undesirable for society to protect all people against each vulnerability 
they face.84  One must therefore determine how society should decide 
which vulnerabilities to protect.  Answering this question requires a 
normative analysis that must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.  
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. See Bray, supra note 68, at 1173 (distinguishing vulnerability to direct harm 
from vulnerability to power); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:  
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008) 
(arguing that “vulnerability is—and should be understood to be—universal and 
constant, inherent in the human condition”). 
 84. First, protecting one individual from vulnerability inevitably interferes in 
some way with the interests of another, at a minimum because it requires the 
redirection of society’s limited resources.  Moreover, there are vulnerabilities that 
society, acting through its government, is ill-suited to protect individuals from 
because, for instance, they may be difficult to predict or the heavy hand of 
government intervention may be inappropriate to address them.  See, e.g., Kyle 
Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 406–30 (2008) (discussing the 
demise of “heartbalm” torts and noting that it resulted, at least in part, from 
practical difficulties of measuring damages and discouraging frivolous suits); Alon 
Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 510 (1999) 
(arguing that even in the limited arena of vulnerability to crime, vulnerabilities that 
arise from certain factors, such as simple bad luck, do not demand state protection).  
Finally, government efforts to protect everyone against all vulnerabilities would 
almost certainly be viewed as unacceptably paternalistic.  See Leslie Bender, Feminist 
(Re)Torts:  Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 848, 889 (“Although the motivation for paternalistic intervention may be 
altruistic, it inevitably involves an element of autonomy-deprivation for the 
‘protected’ party.”).  For a discussion of paternalism concerns in the informant 
context, see infra Part IV. 
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Nonetheless, two widely-accepted societal norms are useful in 
undertaking this analysis in the criminal informant context.  First, 
society generally provides greater protection to unchosen 
vulnerabilities than to those that arise from an individual’s voluntary 
and intelligent choices.  Second, engaging in socially-beneficial 
activity typically entitles an individual to greater protection from 
resulting vulnerabilities. 
1. The importance of choice 
The liberal ideal of equality85 suggests first that “all men are 
created equal”86 and thus are entitled to equal protection under the 
law,87 particularly with respect to personal characteristics over which 
one has little or no control.88 Similarly, the liberal tradition of 
respecting an individual’s autonomy89 suggests that an individual is 
entitled to less protection from the negative repercussions of 
decisions that are a product of her free will.90  With these liberal 
ideals in mind, society undertakes an enhanced duty to protect 
individuals from vulnerabilities that arise from what can be called, 
borrowing from equal protection law, immutable characteristics and 
                                                          
 85. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
49–50 (2010) (asserting that it would violate equality norms for similar offenders to 
be given disparate punishments). 
 86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (requiring that disparate government treatment be justified, at 
a minimum, by a rational relationship with some legitimate government interest). 
 88. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) 
(prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) 
(prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of disability); Parham v. 
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion) (recognizing enhanced 
protection against state action on the basis of “immutable human attributes,” such as 
national origin, illegitimacy, and gender); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
3A1.1(a) (2010) (mandating a sentencing enhancement when a defendant selects a 
victim on the basis of “perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, 
gender, gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation”). 
 89. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws:  The 
Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 663–64 (2004) (discussing the 
liberal tradition of autonomy). 
 90. For instance, the criminal law punishes only those actions that are the result 
of an individual’s free and voluntary choice.  See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause 
and Blame:  A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326–27 (1985) 
(“Central among the beliefs that underlie the criminal law is the distinction between 
nature and will, between the physical world and the world of voluntary human 
action. . . .  Voluntary human actions are not seen as the product of relentless forces, 
but rather as freely chosen expressions of will.”). 
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a diminished duty to protect individuals from vulnerabilities arising 
from an exercise of free will.91 
This clean-sounding dichotomy masks some difficult line-drawing 
issues, however.  First, the concept of immutability is itself 
surprisingly malleable.92  The most clearly “immutable” personal 
characteristics are those that could be described as pure coincidences 
of birth over which an individual truly has no control, such as race, 
color, national origin, genetic makeup, and disability.93  But society 
also provides enhanced protection against discrimination on the basis 
of attributes that are central to an individual’s identity, even though 
they might be mutable in fact, such as religion or gender.94  The 
decision to protect this latter group of characteristics is based on a 
normative judgment that they are either so difficult to change or so 
central to the individual’s identity that society should not expect 
them to be changed.95 
Moreover, some vulnerabilities arise from choices, such as hairstyle, 
clothing, or language, that are expressions of an individual’s 
immutable characteristics.96  Others stem from characteristics, 
including poverty, homelessness, obesity, and drug or alcohol 
addiction, that can be exceedingly difficult to change but are at least 
in part the result of past choices.97  Empirical questions about 
                                                          
 91. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax 
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 632 (2011) (recognizing that all liberal egalitarian 
theories “tolerat[e] unequal outcomes due to choices” and do not tolerate “unequal 
outcomes stemming from the chance circumstances of one’s birth”); Alon Harel, 
Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law:  The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of 
Comparative Fault, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1204–07 (1994) (arguing that individuals 
whose vulnerability to crime arises from involuntary factors should receive enhanced 
protection from crime).  But see Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection:  
The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 490 
n.14, 509–19 (1998) (contributing to criticism of immutability as a basis for 
enhanced equal protection scrutiny). 
 92. See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1511–13 (2011) (discussing two 
primary definitions of “immutability” within Supreme Court and appellate court 
decisions). 
 93. Id. at 1515. 
 94. Id. at 1517–18. 
 95. Id. at 1517. 
 96. Most famously, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
rejected a challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to an American 
Airlines policy that prohibited certain employees from wearing their hair in braids.  
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  The court 
reasoned that the wearing of hair in braids is an “easily changed characteristic,” i.e. a 
choice, and thus not an immutable characteristic protected by Title VII.  Id. at 232.  
Scholars have pointed out how this analysis fails to appreciate the complex interplay 
between the choice made by Rogers to braid her hair and her immutable status as an 
African-American woman.  E.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:  Perspectives on the 
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. 
 97. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) 
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whether a particular vulnerability is the result of an individual’s 
choice or is an accident of her birth can also muddy the waters.  For 
example, the debate between supporters and opponents of 
protections based on sexual orientation often is framed as a factual 
question of whether sexual orientation is a choice.98  Similar 
questions arise about genetic predisposition for other vulnerabilities, 
such as drug addiction and obesity.99 
Though the existence of these issues complicates how choice 
impacts the determination of the extent of society’s obligation to 
protect against a given vulnerability, the principle that choice matters 
remains.  More specifically, society’s responsibility is inversely 
proportional to the strength of the causal relationship between an 
individual’s voluntary choice and the vulnerability at issue.100 
                                                          
(“[G]enerally one cannot become a drug addict or alcoholic, as those terms are 
commonly used, without engaging in at least some voluntary acts (taking drugs, 
drinking alcohol).  Similarly, an individual may become homeless based on factors 
both within and beyond his immediate control, especially in consideration of the 
composition of the homeless as a group:  the mentally ill, addicts, victims of domestic 
violence, the unemployed, and the unemployable.”), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 98. Compare Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crime Law 
Enforcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 251, 
264 (2008) (“First, there is much evidence that sexual orientation is indeed 
immutable, whether for genetic reasons alone, or some combination of genetic and 
environmental reasons.  Even if this evidence is not conclusive, there is certainly no 
scientific basis to conclude that sexual orientation is a matter of personal choice.” 
(footnote omitted)), with Rena M. Lindevaldsen, The Fallacy of Neutrality from 
Beginning to End:  The Battle Between Religious Liberties and Rights Based on Homosexual 
Conduct, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 425, 456 (2010) (contending that unlike “race or 
national origin,” which are “immutable characteristics,” sexual orientation is not 
treated as a suspect classification because there is “at a minimum, some element of 
choice”). 
 99. See Linda C. Fentiman, Rethinking Addiction:  Drugs, Deterrence, and the 
Neuroscience Revolution, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 233, 246–47 (2011) (discussing 
contrasting theories as to whether drug addiction involves individual choice); Allison 
K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance:  The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1930 (2011) (taking note of 
studies suggesting genetic or socioeconomic predispositions to smoking and obesity). 
 100. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), 
and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion), are helpful in illustrating 
the importance of the presence or absence of this causal relationship.  In Robinson, 
the Court held that California violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by 
imposing criminal liability solely on the ground of the petitioner’s status as a drug 
addict.  370 U.S. at 666–67.  The Court reasoned that “in the light of contemporary 
human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease [as drug 
addiction] would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment.”  Id. at 666.  In Powell, however, the Court upheld the 
conviction of the petitioner for public intoxication.  392 U.S. at 516 (plurality 
opinion).  The plurality in Powell distinguished Robinson by noting that Powell was 
not criminally liable for being an alcoholic, but “for public behavior which may 
create substantial health and safety hazards.”  Id. at 532.  Powell thus recognizes the 
important difference between an individual’s status of being a drug addict, which is 
almost always the product of a past choice on her part but is now an immutable 
RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:14 PM 
1452 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1433 
2. Socially-beneficial activities 
Society also has an enhanced duty to protect those vulnerabilities 
that arise from socially-beneficial activities.  For instance, few would 
argue that a soldier’s voluntary decision to assume the risks of service 
means that society has no duty to protect her from those risks.  
Rather, her socially-beneficial activity gives rise to an enhanced duty 
of protection, both to prevent harm101 and to compensate when harm 
occurs.102  Similarly, society protects police officers and firefighters 
from the risks that arise as a result of their service.  Thus, police are 
provided bullet-proof vests and other safety equipment,103 and 
constitutionally-recognized interests of suspects give way to concerns 
for the safety of officers.104 
Socially-beneficial activities entitled to societal protection extend 
beyond prototypical and politically-popular public-service 
employment.  Take unpopular speech, for example.  It benefits 
society by, inter alia, inviting discussion, stirring the dissatisfied into 
action, and inspiring change.105  The importance of protecting those 
who engage in unpopular speech is borne out by the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on the prosecution of those who engage in 
such speech and the imposition on police of the obligation to 
                                                          
characteristic, and her intoxication on a given occasion, which is the more direct 
result of a choice by the defendant.  This is not to say that this distinction is beyond 
reproach.  See Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s 
Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1311–14 (2011) (criticizing the normative value 
of distinguishing status and conduct); Douglas N. Husak, Addiction and Criminal 
Liability, 18 L. & PHIL. 655, 658–59 (1999) (arguing that the pain of withdrawal could 
satisfy the threat of harm element of a duress defense to a charge of illegal drug use).  
Nevertheless, Powell and Robinson can be read to reflect the understanding that as the 
causal relationship between an individual’s past choice and the resulting 
vulnerability becomes more attenuated, society’s obligation to protect against that 
vulnerability becomes more prominent. 
 101. See, e.g., Editorial, A Failure to Protect Our Troops, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at 
A30 (criticizing the Pentagon’s decision to ignore requests from field commanders 
in Iraq for better armor-protected vehicles). 
 102. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950) (noting that the 
compensation system for soldiers “compare[s] extremely favorably” with workers’ 
compensation statutes in finding that additional recovery is not permitted under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010:  A New Dialogue 
Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1255–56 
(2011) (noting broad increases in eligibility for and funding of veterans benefits in 
2010). 
 103. See, e.g., James Guelff and Chris McCurley Body Armor Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3796ll-3 (2006) (providing for the donation of used body armor by federal law 
enforcement to state law enforcement agencies in light of the substantial risk to law 
enforcement officers who do not have body armor). 
 104. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions:  Protecting Police Officers, 
Society, and the Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
623, 635 (1995) (discussing the officer safety rationale for a Terry frisk). 
 105. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1989) (discussing some functions 
of free speech, including inducing unrest, creating dissatisfaction, or inciting anger). 
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prevent violence that might result.106  Unpopular religious practices 
are entitled to enhanced legal protection on similar grounds.107  
Society’s duty to protect also extends to socially-beneficial activities 
not enumerated in the Constitution.108  As a corollary to this 
proposition, the existence of society’s duty generally does not depend 
upon the motivation behind the vulnerable individual’s engagement 
in socially-beneficial activity.  Thus, when the government attempts to 
encourage enlistment in the military through substantial monetary 
bonuses,109 there is no concomitant reduction in protection. 
III. THE VULNERABILITIES OF ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
Throughout the process of cooperating with the State, from her 
recruitment to the eventual completion of her cooperation 
obligations, the active criminal informant primarily has three 
vulnerable interests:  an interest in avoiding punishment, an interest 
in avoiding harm, and an interest in autonomy.110  These interests are 
vulnerable to harm because of both inherent characteristics of the 
informant system and individual characteristics of informants that 
make some informants more vulnerable than others.  The following 
discussion will outline the systemic vulnerabilities and individual 
vulnerabilities in turn and consider in each case the extent of 
society’s obligation to protect against the vulnerability. 
                                                          
 106. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1011–12 (2011) 
(discussing the “heckler’s veto” in Supreme Court precedent). 
 107. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, God of Our Fathers, Gods for Ourselves:  
Fundamentalism and Postmodern Belief, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 901, 910 (2010) 
(noting the Supreme Court’s careful interpretation of federal statutes to protect 
small or unpopular minority religions). 
 108. For instance, in light of the substantial health benefits of breastfeeding, 
nearly every state now protects a woman’s right to breastfeed in public.  Heather M. 
Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant Children:  The Need for Increased Federal 
Intervention to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 333, 333–34 (2010). 
 109. See Simon Romero, Iraq or No, Guard Bonus Lures Some to Re-enlist, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2005, at A10 (noting that National Guard re-enlistment rates rose after 
$15,000 bonuses became available to those who re-listed for six years). 
 110. The informant system has been subject to criticism on a number of other 
grounds, including its negative impact on the purposes of law enforcement, the 
potential it creates for corruption, its deleterious effect on crime victims, and its 
tendency to result in inaccurate outcomes.  See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 31–39, 
69–81 (discussing the varied social and legal costs of reliance on informants).  At 
some level, criminal informants share these interests with society at-large.  Indeed, 
criminal informants on average would likely benefit more than the rest of society 
from improving the accuracy of criminal justice outcomes because they come into 
personal contact with the criminal justice system more frequently than most.  
Nonetheless, such diffuse interests do not approach in importance the individual 
potential informant’s immediate concerns about avoiding punishment, remaining 
unharmed, and being able to make knowing and voluntary choices. 
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A. Systemic Vulnerabilities 
1. The vulnerable interest in avoiding punishment 
Criminal informants have an interest in avoiding punishment for 
their crimes, and this interest is vulnerable to government 
interference when informants cooperate.111  But the informant’s 
interest in avoiding punishment is harmful to society and thus not 
entitled to protection.112  First, allowing an informant to avoid 
punishment undermines the retributive goals of the criminal system 
because she is not punished in accordance with her moral desert.113  
Moreover, the release of known criminal informants back into society 
without punishment interferes with the expressive function of 
criminal law by suggesting that criminal culpability is fungible and 
that the criminal justice system is more important than criminal 
justice itself.114  Finally, to the extent that punishment itself may 
provide some benefit to the informant, avoiding that punishment is 
ultimately harmful to her.115  For these reasons, the discussion of the 
informant’s interests will ignore the informant’s interest in avoiding 
criminal punishment. 
2. The vulnerable interest in being free from harm 
Most concretely, informants risk bodily harm or death should their 
cooperation be discovered.116  An informant’s cooperation can be 
discovered through bad luck or through malfeasance or misfeasance 
                                                          
 111. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1928 (1992) (arguing that abolishing plea bargaining on paternalism 
grounds would harm many defendants by exposing them to longer prison 
sentences). 
 112. The notion that an individual’s interest in engaging in socially-harmful 
activity is not entitled to society’s protection is a corollary to the principle discussed 
above that vulnerabilities arising from socially-beneficial activities are entitled to 
greater protection.  See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Rich, supra note 21, at 741 (asserting that reducing leniency for criminal 
informants will deter crime and increase community faith in police).  But see Simons, 
supra note 13, at 54 (arguing that cooperation itself may be a form of punishment 
that counsels in favor of lighter formal punishments for some informants). 
 114. Natapoff, supra note 16, at 680–82. 
 115. See, e.g., Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 
263, 264 (1981) (emphasizing the good of the wrongdoer as a justification for 
punishment within the paternalistic theory). 
 116. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 33, at 68 (considering the social and physical 
vulnerability of an informant if his identity becomes known to his peers); GARY T. 
MARX, UNDERCOVER:  POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 146 (1988) (attributing 
increased homicide rates in the 1970s, in part, to retaliatory violence against 
suspected informants). 
RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:14 PM 
2012] PROTECTING ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 1455 
by law enforcement.117  While there are no data on the frequency of 
violence against informants, reported cases involving violent crimes 
against informants are legion.118  And the informant is vulnerable to 
harm not only at the hands of those against whom she is cooperating; 
rather, the criminal population at-large may punish a “snitch,” and 
the risk is especially acute if the informant’s cooperation is revealed 
while she is incarcerated.119 
The potential harm facing criminal informants is not limited to 
physical injury.  They also risk moral harm to the extent that they are 
required to commit additional and more severe criminal offenses to 
receive leniency.120  Committing these criminal acts, even though they 
may not be strictly illegal due to State authorization, acclimatizes the 
informant to a level of criminality with which she may not yet be 
familiar.  For instance, an informant who is believed to be involved in 
small-time marijuana dealing may be pressured to set up deals 
involving more serious drugs, like cocaine or heroin, or other 
contraband, such as firearms.121  Beyond the risk that the informant 
will be at risk of physical violence as a result of being out of her depth 
in this more serious criminality,122 this exposure may also break down 
internal barriers to participating in more serious offenses, resulting 
in a sort of “moral corrosion” of the informant.123  Similarly, because 
the informant will likely recognize cooperation as itself an immoral 
act of betrayal, it will leave her demoralized and ill-at-ease with the 
                                                          
 117. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 9–10 (discussing reports that police 
inadvertently or intentionally “burn[ed]” informants, exposing them as 
cooperators). 
 118. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant:  
Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 958 n.213 
(2009) (collecting cases in which informants were harmed or killed). 
 119. See Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
labeling a prison inmate a “snitch” creates a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the 
inmate and collecting cases to that effect from other courts); Simons, supra note 13, 
at 29–30 (“In prison, the cooperator will be exposed to the continual threat of 
physical retaliation, even from prisoners completely unconnected with the 
cooperator.”). 
 120. This risk is analogous to the type faced by undercover police officers who 
engage in authorized illegality to maintain their cover and gain the trust of the 
targets of their investigation.  See Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It:  
Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 190 (2009) (discussing the 
psychological harms and temptations suffered by undercover agents who participate 
in authorized crimes). 
 121. See Rich, supra note 21, at 681–84 (discussing the case of Rachel Morningstar 
Hoffman). 
 122. See id. at 683–84 (asserting that Hoffman risked injury and death in order to 
cooperate with the police). 
 123. See Joh, supra note 120, at 190 (discussing the “moral corrosion” of 
undercover agents who participate in crimes). 
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actions that she undertakes.124 
Finally, criminal informants also risk harm to their relationships 
with others, a harm that will be referred to as “social harm.”125  
Specifically, if her cooperation is discovered, the criminal informant 
is likely to be ostracized by both her criminal and law-abiding 
communities.  She may find it difficult to continue making a living 
through illicit means, as other criminals will be unwilling to trust a 
known “rat.” 126  Moreover, she may be deprived of legitimate business 
opportunities, as well as interaction with others in her religious or 
ethnic communities.127  Such isolation, combined with the constant 
threat of physical harm, can take a substantial psychological toll on 
the informant.128  The concept of “social harm” as used herein 
therefore includes both economic and psychological harm to the 
informant. 
The informant’s vulnerabilities to harm arise from her involvement 
in the socially-beneficial activity of assisting the police.129  As a result, 
                                                          
 124. Simons, supra note 13, at 31. 
 125. This use of the term “social harm” is entirely distinct from the concept of 
“social harm” that underpins criminal law.  See, e.g., Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification 
and Excuse:  What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 725, 805 (2004) (discussing the traditional use of the concept of “social 
harm” in criminal law, where a “harm is referred to as ‘social harm’ because the 
prohibited conduct is a public wrong that offends the common good”). 
 126. See Simons, supra note 13, at 29–31 (observing the costs of ostracism of 
cooperators from criminal and legitimate social groups). 
 127. Id. at 30; see Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 79–80 
(1995) (noting the “social cost” of becoming an informant). 
 128. See Estate of Rhoad v. East Vincent Twp, No. 05-5875, 2006 WL 1071573, at 
*1–2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2006) (deciding a § 1983 claim involving an informant who 
committed suicide after police refused to allow him to cease cooperation and enter 
drug rehabilitation); Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1241, 
1245–46 (E.D. Va. 1992) (adjudicating a § 1983 claim that a seventeen-year-old 
informant committed suicide as a result of threats received after he agreed to 
cooperate), aff’d per curiam, 991 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1993); David Hasemyer & Mark T. 
Sullivan, Courtroom Suicide Exposes DEA Dark Side:  Informant’s Death Reveals Seamy 
Underworld of the Drug War, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Jan. 27, 1992, at A1 (discussing the case 
of an informant who committed suicide in courtroom after being sentenced to 
twenty-five years in prison). 
 129. The description of assisting the police as a socially-beneficial activity does not 
reflect an empirical assessment of whether the assistance that any one informant 
provides to the police in fact provides a net benefit to society.  Cf. Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903, 905–10 (2011) (suggesting that 
cooperation may cause a net harm to society and recommending studies of 
informant use to determine the extent of such harm).  Rather, it acknowledges two 
less debatable propositions.  First, assisting the police is behavior that society wishes 
to encourage because enforcement of the criminal laws is necessary to social stability 
and cannot be accomplished efficiently without civilian cooperation.  Cf. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477–78 (1966) (“It is an act of responsible citizenship for 
individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.”).  
Second, though assistance may not benefit society in all cases, it would be unjust for 
society to externalize that risk at the expense of the criminal informant, who is less 
capable than the relevant agents of the State to determine whether cooperation in a 
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society owes the informant a greater duty to protect her against the 
resulting risks of harm.130  But the contention may be made that the 
promise of leniency offered to an informant is compensation enough 
for those risks and that additional protections are not required.131  In 
this vein, Judge Posner, explaining why inducing an informant to 
engage in sexual intercourse with the target of an investigation is not 
necessarily a constitutional violation, argued in dicta that:   
[C]onfidential informants often agree to engage in risky 
undercover work in exchange for leniency, and we cannot think of 
any reason, especially any reason rooted in constitutional text or 
doctrine, for creating a categorical prohibition against the 
informant’s incurring a cost that takes a different form from the 
usual risk of being beaten up or for that matter bumped off by a 
drug dealer with whom one is negotiating a purchase or sale of 
drugs in the hope of obtaining lenient treatment from the 
government.132 
There are two responses to this argument.  First, informant 
recruitment is so inherently coercive that the decisions of some 
criminal informants to cooperate are not voluntary.133  Even on the 
terms of Judge Posner’s argument, an informant who does not agree 
voluntarily to exchange her cooperation for the promise of leniency 
is still entitled to protection.134 
Second, Judge Posner’s argument delineates only the State’s legal 
obligations to criminal informants, not society’s normative duties.135  
                                                          
given case will be beneficial.  For these reasons, cooperation is properly viewed as 
socially beneficial activity that gives rise to a duty to protect the cooperator. 
 130. See Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 962–63 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing 
that the federal Witness Protection Program was created “in response to a felt moral 
obligation to repay citizens who risk life by carrying out their duty as citizens to 
testify”); cf. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 & n.2 (1961) (recognizing 
that an accomplice to a crime has a duty, like every other citizen, to testify despite 
threats of physical reprisals, even though the State also has an obligation to protect 
citizens from harm). 
 131. See, e.g., Vélez-Díaz v. Vega-Irizarry, 421 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting a 
Bivens claim by family members of a murdered criminal informant because “[t]here 
are risks inherent in being a cooperating witness . . . and the witness voluntarily 
assumes those risks”); Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(dismissing a constitutional claim arising from the murder of a criminal informant 
who “voluntarily agreed to serve as a confidential informant, albeit ‘motivated by . . . 
promises regarding the decedent’s pending drug charge’”). 
 132. Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 133. See supra Part I.B (detailing the coercive influences police exert over potential 
informants, including capitalizing on fear of punishment and emphasizing the 
maximize penalties). 
 134. See Alexander, 329 F.3d at 918 (recognizing that police tactics rising to the 
level of coercion are actionable under § 1983 based on the premise that the 
informant’s consent is deemed involuntary). 
 135. Posner is of course correct as a legal matter:  the Supreme Court in DeShaney 
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services held that because the Due Process 
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As discussed previously, choice is not the only touchstone in 
ascertaining whether society has a duty to protect a vulnerable 
individual.136  Rather, society also has a normative duty to protect 
those who engage in socially-beneficial activities, such as assisting law 
enforcement.  This duty governs despite the admittedly selfish 
motivations that drive most informants.137  Moreover, failing to 
protect informants runs contrary to due process norms by stripping 
criminal informants of society’s protections and essentially punishing 
them for their criminal activity without requiring a conviction and 
providing them the benefit of due process.138 
3. The vulnerable interest in autonomy 
Like everyone else, criminal informants have an interest in 
preserving their autonomy, i.e., in being permitted to make decisions 
about their own lives free from government intervention.139  With 
respect to cooperation, this means that informants have an interest in 
being permitted to weigh the risks and benefits of assisting the police, 
to decide whether cooperation is in their best interest, and to have 
that decision be given full effect. 
The impact of the informant recruitment system on the autonomy 
of potential informants has been the subject of only limited scholarly 
discussion.140  Scholarship on the impact of plea bargaining on a 
criminal defendant’s autonomy is far more voluminous, however.141  
                                                          
Clause only limits the State’s power to act, it does not require the government to 
protect citizens from injury at the hands of third parties absent some State action 
depriving the individual of the power to protect herself.  489 U.S. 189, 195–96 
(1989). 
 136. Supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Simons, supra note 13, at 2 (“[C]ooperators want what only prosecutors 
can offer:  leniency, or at least a recommendation for leniency.”). 
 138. Though this does not give rise to a constitutional claim, it runs contrary to 
the due process principle that one should not be subject to punishment prior to 
conviction for a crime.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (considering 
whether the conditions of the defendant’s pretrial detention constituted punishment 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 139. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy:  The Criminal Defendant’s Right to 
Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2010) (discussing the autonomy interest 
associated with a criminal defendant’s conditional rights).  Though autonomy can be 
a “protean concept,” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
875, 876 (1994), the application of the ideal of autonomy herein is sufficiently 
straightforward that complexities about its precise definition can be set aside. 
 140. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 40–41 (discussing the imbalance of power and 
disparity of information between law enforcement and potential new informants). 
 141. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 
(1992) (arguing for the abolition of plea bargaining and questioning “[t]he 
presumptive fairness of settlement”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1910 
(analyzing plea bargaining under a contract theory); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289 (1983) (analyzing 
plea bargaining as an element of a market system, part of what “set[s] the ‘price’ of 
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Given the structural similarity between plea bargains and cooperation 
agreements,142 plea bargaining literature provides an instructive 
starting point for analyzing the impact of cooperation agreements on 
informant autonomy. 
From the standpoint of enhancing autonomy, permitting 
cooperation, like allowing plea bargaining, gives the negotiating 
civilian more choices than she would have available otherwise.143  That 
said, the institution of plea bargaining is frequently criticized for 
encumbering defendants with many bargaining disadvantages, 
including the critique that the “freedom” to plea bargain is neither 
free nor voluntary.144  Some of these criticisms are particularly 
relevant to cooperation agreements.  Critics argue, inter alia, that 
threats of criminal sanction are so coercive as to render any plea 
bargain involuntary; that plea agreements are unconscionable 
because of the vastly superior bargaining position occupied by the 
State; and that plea bargains are essentially fraudulent because 
defendants lack information material to their ability to make an 
informed agreement.145  These arguments will be discussed in turn 
below, with a particular emphasis on what the differences between 
plea bargains and cooperation agreements suggest about a potential 
informant’s entitlement to protection of her autonomy interests. 
a. The coercive threat of criminal sanctions 
Whenever a civilian negotiates with the State with the possibility of 
criminal sanctions on the line, the civilian is faced with the “difficult 
choice” of deciding what she is willing to give up to avoid that 
sanction.146  In the case of a pleading defendant, the State demands 
that she give up her constitutional right to trial in exchange for some 
                                                          
crime”). 
 142. Specifically, in the context of both plea bargaining and cooperation 
agreements, an individual suspected of criminal activity contemplates whether to 
exchange something of great value, be it her right to trial or her active assistance, for 
leniency in an actual or potential criminal prosecution.  See Natapoff, supra note 16, 
at 664–65 (describing cooperation agreements as “an extreme form of plea 
bargain”). 
 143. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1913–17 (discussing the autonomy 
benefits of plea bargains); see also Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 317 (same).  
Without the option of becoming an informant, the choices of a majority of potential 
criminal informants would be limited to those available to any individual suspected 
of a crime. 
 144. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction?  The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 490 n.231 (2001). 
 145. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1919–24 (collecting and responding to 
arguments that plea bargaining is coercive or unconscionable). 
 146. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:14 PM 
1460 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1433 
measure of certainty about the punishment she will receive.147  The 
potential criminal informant is offered a similar bargain:  she can 
work for the police in exchange for a more lenient punishment—or 
possibly no punishment at all—for her crimes.148 
But difficult choices are not necessarily involuntary ones.149  Thus, 
in the plea bargaining context, the question boils down to whether 
the threat of criminal sanctions is so severe or the offer of leniency so 
compelling that the defendant agrees to the bargain involuntarily.150  
Critics of plea bargaining claim that criminal sanctions are so 
inherently unpleasant, and the opportunity to avoid them so 
desirable, that an offer of leniency overcomes the will of the 
negotiating defendant in all cases.151 
A similar argument could be made, of course, in the context of 
potential informants who negotiate with law enforcement officers 
who are threatening them with criminal sanctions if they fail to 
cooperate.  Such an argument gives rise to the same question:  are 
threats of criminal sanctions so inherently coercive that they render 
one incapable of entering into a voluntary agreement?  The Supreme 
                                                          
 147. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1914. 
 148. See Rich, supra note 21, at 713–16 (arguing that demanding cooperation 
under the threat of more severe criminal punishment violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude). 
 149. In Aristotle’s famous example, a ship’s captain caught in a storm who 
jettisons cargo in order to save his crew has acted voluntarily in the sense that he 
freely made a choice between two undesirable results.  See Joseph M. Perillo, The 
Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 427, 469 (2000) (using Aristotle’s example to illustrate that, even in cases of 
duress, the element of choice exists); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1920 
(“[C]oercion in the sense of few and unpalatable choices does not necessarily negate 
voluntary choice.”). 
 150. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (noting the validity of plea bargaining so 
long as the defendant is free to accept or decline for her own reasons).  It should be 
noted that critics of plea bargaining and the informant system both raise numerous 
other concerns with these two aspects of the criminal justice system.  See, e.g., 
NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 31–38 (discussing numerous critiques of the informant 
system); Schulhofer, supra note 141, at 1979 (arguing that plea bargaining “impairs 
the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the 
guilty from the innocent”).  These arguments are outside the scope of this Article, 
however, which focuses on interests typically ignored in the literature:  those unique 
to the potential criminal informant. 
 151. Critics of plea bargaining go as far as to analogize plea bargain negotiations 
to negotiating at gunpoint or under threat of torture.  See Albert W. Alschuler, 
Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels:  The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1417 (2003) (arguing that guilty pleas, following protestations 
of innocence and induced by threats of additional punishment, cannot be relied 
upon); Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 97–99 
(1976) (noting that, whether threatened with a gun during a robbery or with the 
death penalty during a trial, a reasonable victim may have no choice but to give in to 
the coercion); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3 
(1978) (arguing parallels in the origin, function, and doctrine of the laws of modern 
plea bargaining and medieval torture). 
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Court152 and supporters of plea-bargaining153 have argued that they 
are not.  However, the claim that the potential informant should be 
entitled to per se protection from this possible coercion fails for 
another reason:  the informant’s vulnerability to the coercive threat 
of criminal sanctions is the result of her choice to engage in criminal 
activity.154  Put simply, every individual knows that, should she commit 
a crime and authorities discover it, she will face difficult choices that 
hinge on the threat of criminal sanctions.155  Moreover, citizens are 
generally aware of criminal sanctions and expect them to be 
sufficiently unpleasant to deter crime.156  Thus, a potential 
                                                          
 152. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (“While confronting a defendant with the 
risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a ‘discouraging effect on the 
defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] 
an inevitable’—and permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates 
and encourages the negotiation of pleas.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Chaffin 
v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973))); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 
(1970) (rejecting the argument that a plea bargain is per se involuntary if 
prosecution seeks the death penalty); see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 
196, 209–10 (1995) (holding that requiring a waiver of otherwise excluded 
statements made during negotiation as a condition of entering into plea discussion 
was not unconstitutionally coercive, as the dilemma facing the defendant “is 
indistinguishable from any of a number of difficult choices that criminal defendants 
face every day”). 
 153. Scott and Stuntz argue that under a contract theory of duress, a contract is 
voidable by one party only if the other wrongfully compelled her to enter into the 
contract.  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1919.  Consequently, the dispositive 
question in the plea-bargaining context is whether the prosecutor is responsible for 
the coercive nature of the plea bargain.  Id. at 1920–21.  In a typical case, absent 
strategic manipulation of post-trial sentences by the prosecutor, sentencing policy is 
to blame for the coercion, so there is no duress as a matter of contract law.  Id. 
 154. Of course, this may not always be the case.  Another significant objection to 
plea-bargaining is that prosecutors can coerce risk-averse innocent defendants into 
pleading guilty to avoid the chance that they might be found guilty and subjected to 
a lengthy prison sentence.  Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 
1171–72 (2011).  Similarly, when the State erroneously threatens an innocent 
individual with prosecution, she might decide to become an active informant to 
avoid the risk of allowing the threatened prosecution to move forward.  Although 
there is no hard data on how frequently police threaten innocent people with 
criminal charges to coerce cooperation, anecdotal reports suggest that it does occur.  
See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 52–53.  While such cases fall outside the scope of 
this Article, potential informants who are innocent of threatened charges would 
particularly benefit from the information-enhancing proposals set forth infra Part 
VI.C. 
 155. Indeed, the possibility of avoiding punishment through cooperation is an 
ingrained fact in criminal culture.  See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 43–44 (lamenting 
the trend toward criminals mitigating punishment for serious crimes by seeking 
cooperation with prosecutors); Richard Rosenfeld et al., Snitching and the Code of the 
Street, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 291, 298–300 (2003) (observing that informers 
weigh—and perhaps underestimate—risks to avoid detention, yet experience has 
taught several that routine police pressure tactics often overstate the threat of jail 
time). 
 156. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal 
Procedure:  The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1390 
(2003) (invoking Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, who viewed punishment’s 
pain as a way to offset its benefits while also communicating to society both 
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informant’s vulnerability to such threats can be said to arise from her 
knowing, voluntary choice to engage in criminal activity,157 and society 
should not forbid cooperation on the ground that potential criminal 
informants deserve protection from the unpleasant choice between 
jail and cooperation.158 
b. The State’s superior bargaining position 
Critics of plea-bargaining also contend that the inherent 
differential in bargaining power between the prosecutor and the 
defendant is so vast that plea bargains are unconscionable.159  
According to these critics, prosecutors face little risk of acquittal at 
trial, while defendants face a steeply increased punishment in the 
                                                          
condemnation and the unpleasant consequences of criminality). 
 157. Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in the plea-bargaining context 
hinge on the assumption that only guilty defendants plead guilty.  See Corinna 
Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters:  Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining 
Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 19–20 & n.89 (2002) (collecting various Supreme Court 
cases that presume the accuracy of guilty pleas and thus declining to upset their 
finality).  As a result, they suggest that part of the reason why society will not protect 
criminal defendants from the potential coercion in the plea-bargaining context is 
that the defendant’s vulnerability arises from her choice to engage in criminal 
conduct. 
 158. Of course, just because society should not forbid all cooperation agreements 
on the ground that the threat of criminal sanction is coercive does not mean that all 
such agreements are valid.  See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995) 
(“[A]lthough some waiver agreements ‘may not be the product of an informed and 
voluntary decision,’ this possibility ‘does not justify invalidating all such 
agreements.’” (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987))).  The 
Due Process Clause forbids involuntary confessions and plea agreements, and the 
Supreme Court’s plea-bargaining jurisprudence instructs lower courts to engage in a 
case-by-case review to ensure that no due process violations have occurred.  See id. 
(suggesting that courts should engage in a case-by-case review of waiver agreements 
to ensure a lack of coercion or fraud); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750–55 
(1970) (refusing to forbid plea agreements entirely and instead asking whether, on 
the facts of the case, the defendant entered into the agreement involuntarily); 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (“It is now axiomatic that a defendant in 
a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole 
or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of 
the confession . . . .”).  Such a case-by-case analysis in the informant context would 
permit potential informants protection from vulnerabilities, including those 
discussed infra Part VI.C, that are not the result of their own choice.  Cf. Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (“[O]ne might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in 
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect 
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for 
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials . . . 
.”). 
 159. See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining:  The Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45–51 (dividing prosecutors’ 
dominance into four elements:  (1) low risk to the prosecutor of acquittal if the case 
goes to trial; (2) high risk to a defendant of a “trial penalty”; (3) ability to charge a 
defendant with crimes more serious than warranted; and (4) alignment of defense 
attorneys’ personal interests in acquiescing; resulting in “a process which is not an 
adversarial negotiation”). 
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likely event that they are found guilty.160  As a result, prosecutors have 
the power to determine the defendant’s sentence unilaterally and 
impose it in the form of a non-negotiable offer.161  Plea-bargaining’s 
supporters contend that the prosecutor’s bargaining power 
advantage is not as great as feared.162  This is because, unlike an 
individual customer of a mass-market good who has little to offer the 
seller, each defendant has the right to force a costly and time-
consuming trial.163  According to these scholars, the power to allow 
the prosecutor to forego such a trial is sufficient to prevent the plea 
bargain from being unconscionable.164 
Cooperation is similar to plea-bargaining because the State’s offer 
of leniency is of great value to the potential informant.  But the 
bargaining position of potential informants varies more than the 
plea-bargaining defendant’s and often is much weaker.  In particular, 
while a plea-bargaining defendant always has something valuable to 
offer the prosecutor, the information and access that most potential 
informants can provide is essentially fungible.165  For instance, low-
level drug offenders generally can do little more than use their 
criminal connections to arrange for controlled drug buys that allow 
police to arrest other minor criminals.166  Though these connections 
have some value, legions of individuals commit minor drug offenses 
and have such connections.167  Moreover, an offender who refuses to 
cooperate places only a slight burden on the arresting officer who 
tried to obtain her cooperation.  At most, the officer must bear the 
cost of passing any evidence of the offender’s wrongdoing on to a 
                                                          
 160. Id. at 45–46. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1923–24 & n.55. 
 163. Id. at 1924. 
 164. Id. 
 165. A handful of informants do possess substantial bargaining power in that few 
others share their access to evidence.  For instance, an informant with established 
contacts to a suspected criminal organization—be it a terrorist group, a street gang, 
or a corrupt business—is in a strong position to negotiate with the police.  These 
informants can save law enforcement untold hours of work and mitigate many of the 
potential risks to agents and thus can exact a heavy price for their information.  The 
relative utility of such high-value informants and their scarcity can be seen in the 
extensive protections provided by the federal Witness Security Program to a small 
number of federal informants.  See infra notes 251–56 and accompanying text 
(detailing extensive measures authorized to protect potential witnesses to serious 
crimes). 
 166. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 51 (finding that drug-addicted informants 
typically arranged stings that caught dealers in possession of ten to twenty bags or 
vials of drugs). 
 167. See SKOLNICK, supra note 23, at 121–22 (noting that while “the police need 
informers,” the target of an informant’s sting often “cannot bring themselves to 
believe how little they have been sold out for”). 
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prosecutor and testifying at trial.168  Thus, most potential informants 
resemble the consumer of a mass-marketed good:  she can impose 
only a minimal cost on the government agent by refusing to 
cooperate while the agent can impose a substantial cost on her 
should she refuse.169  This puts the potential informant in a “take-it-
or-leave-it” situation typical of a contract of adhesion.170 
Yet here again, the potential informant’s vulnerability to the State’s 
unequal bargaining power results from the informant’s voluntary and 
knowing decision to engage in criminal conduct.171  By engaging in 
criminal activity, an individual knowingly submits herself to the 
State’s monopoly over criminal punishment, and it is no secret that 
the decision of whether to grant her leniency in exchange for 
cooperation is at the discretion of law enforcement agents.  Similarly, 
courts will refuse to find adhesion contracts unconscionable where 
the weaker party failed to avail herself of alternatives prior to 
negotiating, including the option to walk away.172  As such, the 
                                                          
 168. In most drug cases the burden on officers will not include testifying in court, 
as more than ninety percent of those convicted of drug offenses are convicted 
through a guilty plea, and very few charges are resolved through acquittal.  Beth A. 
Freeborn, Arrest Avoidance:  Law Enforcement and the Price of Cocaine, 52 J.L. & ECON. 19, 
29–30 (2009). 
 169. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2565 (2004) (“In a system (like ours) that rewards snitches 
generously, some defendants will be punished very harshly—nominally for their 
crimes, but actually for not having the kind of information one gets only by working 
at high levels of criminal organizations.”). 
 170. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
139, 202 (2005) (“Similarly, adhesion contract doctrine explicitly incorporates 
inequality of bargaining power by defining adhesion contracts as those presented on 
a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with 
weaker bargaining power.”).  See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts:  True 
Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 866–73 (2010) 
(discussing approaches taken by courts and scholars to so-called “pizza-box” 
contracts in the consumer realm:  classical and formalistic, as well as relational and 
behavioral). 
 171. Again, this analysis is based on the assumption that the potential informant is 
a potential criminal informant, i.e., an individual who in fact has engaged in criminal 
activity.  See supra note 154 and accompanying text (explaining that avoiding the risk 
of worse outcomes can incentivize innocent defendants to plead guilty); supra note 
157 (contemplating the Supreme Court’s reliance on the assumption of truth). 
 172. See Barnhizer, supra note 170, at 204–05 (underscoring the fact that 
negotiating parties always have the option to refuse agreement, so adhesive terms are 
not inherently coercive).  Moreover, equalizing the bargaining power would permit 
potential informants to maximize their interest in avoiding criminal punishment.  
This interest is not one that the State should protect.  See supra notes 111–15 and 
accompanying text (explaining that asymmetrical bargaining creates a disincentive 
for harmful activity and that the resulting vulnerabilities do not arise from socially-
beneficial activities entitled greater protection).  In contrast, enabling the consumer 
to negotiate on a relatively equal footing in an open market vindicates broader 
societal interests.  See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1411–
16 (2004) (arguing that underestimating costs at the time of agreement translates 
into ultimately bearing that burden when conditions make it relatively costlier, 
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potential informant, unlike the consumer facing an unconscionable 
adhesion contract, is not entitled to protection from her weakness in 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the State.173 
c. Information asymmetry 
Critics also argue that plea bargains are unconscionable because 
the prosecutor has superior knowledge of the strength of the case 
against the defendant as well as the “‘market value’ for such a 
case.”174  The supporter’s response is that the terms of a plea bargain 
are usually straightforward, and thus even the most substandard 
defense counsel can assist a defendant in effectively negotiating a 
plea.175 
Unlike the plea-bargaining defendant, however, the potential 
informant has no right to counsel.176  As a result, she does not have 
access to a lawyer’s expertise in evaluating government offers in light 
of the facts and “customary practices.”177  The potential informant 
faces numerous unknowns, including the charges she might 
confront, the chance of being convicted on those charges, the 
possible sentence she might receive, and the going market value of 
any cooperation she could provide.178  Police and prosecutors, on the 
other hand, know the evidence they have against the potential 
                                                          
distorting incentive structures critical to the freedom of contract). 
 173. The conclusion that potential informants are not entitled to per se 
protection from coercion by the strong arm of the State may seem unjust at first 
blush.  Importantly, however, the absence of per se safeguards does not preclude 
measures more narrowly-tailored to protect individual informants who are 
particularly susceptible to coercion for reasons that are not the direct result of their 
choices.  See infra Part VI.B (detailing the specialized protections in place for certain 
classes of at-risk informants). 
 174. See Kevin O’Keefe, Comment, Two Wrongs Make a Wrong:  A Challenge to Plea 
Bargaining and Collateral Consequence Statutes Through Their Integration, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 243, 260 (2010); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.:  The 
Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 430–31 (2009) (asserting 
that the limited access the defense has to information during the discovery process 
further exacerbates bargaining disparities). 
 175. See Easterbrook, supra note 141, at 309–10 (asserting that there is little reason 
to believe that discrepancies in lawyer access or information translates to less 
effective counsel); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1922–23 (crediting experience 
and custom for narrowing the “bargaining range” to one “both small and familiar to 
the parties,” resulting in “a good sense of the [particular case’s] ‘market price’”). 
 176. See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2000) (identifying 
indictment as the threshold for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
 177. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1923 & n.50 (asserting that criminal 
defendants do not necessarily have knowledge of likely trial outcomes or the 
sentence usually assigned to a guilty plea at the plea bargain stage of the process). 
 178. See id. at 1959 (recognizing that a defense lawyer is necessary in the plea-
bargaining context because only the lawyer has the background experience to 
differentiate between a good and a bad deal based on her knowledge of trial 
outcomes and sentencing and the market for plea-bargains). 
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informant and have the experience to ascertain the charges that she 
is likely to face and the sentences that might result from such 
charges.179  As a result, cooperation agreements “are often struck on 
the basis of incomplete, highly imperfect information and little more 
than the [potential informant’s] guess about what a trial might reveal 
if one were held.”180 
The potential informant’s vulnerability to this information 
asymmetry—unlike coercive threats of criminal sanctions and 
inherently unequal bargaining power—does not directly result from a 
knowing and voluntary choice.  The criminal justice system operates 
on an explicit constitutional guarantee that a defendant has a right to 
notice of the charges against her.181  Though the system almost 
certainly does not require specific notice of charges prior to 
cooperation negotiations,182 the explicit statement of that right also 
does not suggest to the potential informant that law enforcement 
may seek her cooperation without informing her of the specific 
charges against her.183  Moreover, police tactics that discourage the 
potential informant from consulting with counsel or taking time to 
consider the wisdom of accepting the government’s offer exacerbate 
her ignorance.184  Because the potential informant’s vulnerability to 
this information asymmetry is not the result of a knowing and 
                                                          
 179. See Taslitz, supra note 174, at 430–31 (discussing the information asymmetry 
between the prosecution and defendant in the plea bargaining context).  Of course, 
many potential informants are themselves “repeat players” in the criminal justice 
system.  Nonetheless, the personal experience of even the most hardened criminal 
with charging and sentencing decisions pales in the comparison with that of a police 
officer or prosecutor. 
 180. Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 137 (1994) (referring to attorneys’ guesses for defendants’ 
odds of conviction). 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 182. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) (“Notice, to comply with due process 
requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings 
so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must set forth the 
alleged misconduct with particularity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 183. Though the maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” embodies 
important norms, see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the 
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 127–28 (1997), it applies only in those situations 
where it can be said that a rule exists and that at least constructive notice of such a 
rule is possible.  See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1587–90 (2005) (observing that, where the law is unknowable 
even in principle, the notice requirement has no practical effect, inconsistent with its 
“sacred and inviolable” status in other contexts).  Here, the exercise of law 
enforcement discretion in the negotiation of cooperation agreements is not 
definable by rules, and even if it were possible to glean a set of rules from practice, 
the potential informant does not have access to an attorney, who would be the only 
one with the necessary experience to ascertain those rules. 
 184. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (characterizing high-pressure 
police tactics reported by the ACLU). 
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voluntary choice, society should protect the informant against it. 
d. Unenforceability 
Cooperation agreements also threaten a potential informant’s 
autonomy interests because they are usually unenforceable.  First, the 
length or nature of the assistance required of the informant or the 
nature of the leniency promised by the government may be so vague 
as to be unenforceable.185  Second, the government agent who enters 
into a cooperation agreement may lack the authority to bind the 
government.186  Third, the agreement almost always reserves to the 
government complete discretion to decide whether the informant’s 
cooperation warrants leniency.187  Thus, an active informant is 
vulnerable to the risk that she will agree to work for the police only to 
be denied, without recourse, any benefit for doing so.188 
Absent some express notice to the potential informant of the likely 
unenforceability of any promise made by the State, the informant’s 
                                                          
 185. Cf. Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1308–10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting 
a claim by an IRS informant for a monetary award on the ground that no contract 
arises from an indefinite award offer and informant conduct in response). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 84–91 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
an informant’s claim to use and derivative use immunity arising from promises made 
by FBI agents on the ground that the agents lacked the authority to grant immunity); 
Confidential Informant v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1, 7 (2000) (holding that IRS 
and FBI agents did not have the actual authority to promise reward to IRS 
informant); see also Alemany, supra note 51, at 260–66 (collecting cases where the 
courts denied plaintiff-informants’ sums allegedly promised to them on the basis that 
the agents involved had no actual authority to contract on the agencies’ behalf). 
 187. See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line:  A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel 
Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1662 (2003) (adding that a defendant’s only 
recourse is to assert constitutional claims for the promised motions); Richman, supra 
note 127, at 102 n.114 (collecting cases affirming prosecutors’ exclusive discretion). 
 188. It is worth noting that there are good reasons for the doctrines that render 
cooperation agreements unenforceable.  The requirement of definiteness, for 
instance, guarantees that the government is held to perform only those promises that 
they intended to make.  See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite 
Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1649–51 (2003) (summarizing the common law 
approach that courts will not infer an intent to be bound if the parties leave material 
terms unspecified and also delineating its tension with a modern trend toward 
contextually supplying terms).  The requirement of actual authority to bind the 
government stems from concerns about sovereign immunity and a desire to protect 
the public fisc from the actions of unauthorized government agents.  See Alan I. 
Saltman, The Government’s Liability for Actions of Its Agents That Are Not Specifically 
Authorized:  The Continuing Influence of Merrill and Richmond, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 775, 
781 (2003) (stating that conserving public moneys and the separation of powers 
informs the doctrine of sovereign immunity).  Additionally, by maintaining 
discretion to assess the informant’s compliance with the agreement, the State helps 
to guarantee the informant’s enthusiastic and honest cooperation and to maintain its 
control over the informant.  See Richman, supra note 127, at 95–102 (explaining that 
the government needs a mechanism in place to discourage a defendant from 
defecting from an agreement).  Whether these reasons justify the unwillingness of 
courts to enforce cooperation agreements is a separate question, however, and one 
outside the scope of the instant inquiry. 
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vulnerability to the risk that she will be unable to enforce the State’s 
promise is not the result of her informed choice.  A potential 
informant may believe, entirely reasonably, that when an agent of the 
State makes a promise, even one that is in some way indefinite, the 
promise will be enforceable.  As such, the State has a duty to protect 
against this vulnerability. 
Moreover, at least in some cases, government agents make 
promises to potential informants for the purpose of encouraging 
cooperation but with the knowledge that they are unenforceable.189  
In doing so, agents take advantage of the pre-existing information 
asymmetry between them and informants.190  This is particularly 
troubling where the agent has dissuaded the potential informant 
from seeking the assistance of counsel, who would no doubt inform 
her of the likely unenforceability of the State’s promise.191  The 
former resembles a case of promissory estoppel;192 the latter looks like 
promissory fraud.193  In either event, the equities favor requiring the 
                                                          
 189. No data are available to suggest how frequently police officers make such 
promises, but there is ample reason to believe that such cases are not uncommon.  
First, it is well-established that law enforcement agents are permitted to lie and 
engage in other trickery in their dealings with suspected criminals.  See Christopher 
Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:  Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 
778–79 (1997) (highlighting the Supreme Court’s deference to law enforcement 
agents’ judgment that valuable information would be inaccessible without 
deception).  Some experts specifically encourage police to lie when attempting to 
recruit criminal informants.  See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 23 (advocating for 
“informed bluff[ing]” as an effective tool in recruiting informants).  Moreover, law 
enforcement guidelines for the handling of confidential informants often make clear 
that agents lack the authority to promise immunity or leniency to informants and 
instruct agents not to make such promises.  See Flemmi, 225 F.3d at 88–89 (discussing 
historical FBI guidelines on the use of informants relating to promises of immunity); 
JOHN ASHCROFT, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 5 (2002) 
[hereinafter DOJ GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/standards/ 
invprg1211apph.pdf (describing cases where informants claim that law enforcement 
agents made unauthorized promises of leniency or immunity continue to arise). 
 190. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1140 (2009) (discussing the benefits to a party of knowingly 
including unenforceable terms in a contract). 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 48 (referring to defense counsel’s ability to 
increase bargaining power as one reason police attempt to discourage their 
presence). 
 192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) (“A promise which 
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part 
of the promisee . . . is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement . . . .”); 
David G. Epstein et al., Reliance on Oral Promises:  Statute of Frauds and “Promissory 
Estoppel,” 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 913, 915 (2010) (setting forth the elements of 
promissory estoppel:  “(1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the 
promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment,” and adding 
that various authorities have adopted essentially the same approach (quoting English 
v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983))). 
 193. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 507, 508–09 (“If a court finds that a defendant-promisor did not intend at the 
RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:14 PM 
2012] PROTECTING ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 1469 
State to protect the potential informant from the risk that she might 
rely on unenforceable promises made knowingly by its agents.194 
B. Individual Vulnerabilities 
Beyond the systemic characteristics of the informant system that 
make all informants vulnerable to coercion and harm, an informant 
who is a minor, mentally ill, or mentally handicapped is especially 
vulnerable to harm or interference with her autonomy interests.  
Social scientists and courts recognize that minors are more 
susceptible than adults to coercion from authority figures, such as 
police and prosecutors,195 and that they are less capable of accurately 
assessing the likely consequences of their decisions.196  Similarly, 
individuals who are mentally ill are more susceptible to authoritarian 
pressure in situations that may not appear coercive to others.197  The 
                                                          
time of promising to perform her promise, then the court can subject her to both 
compensatory and punitive damages under the doctrine of promissory fraud . . . .”). 
 194. This is not to say that informants should be able to bring actions for either 
promissory estoppel or promissory fraud, as the same reasons justifying the 
unenforceability of the agent’s promises, see supra note 188, also would counsel 
against allowing such actions.  See generally Ayres & Klass, supra note 193, at 526–32 
(discussing situations where fraud with respect to unenforceable promises should not 
give rise to valid actions for promissory fraud). 
 195. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (reviewing 
precedent and concluding that “a reasonable child subjected to police questioning 
will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to 
go”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (holding that in the absence of counsel “the 
greatest care must be taken to assure that [a minor’s] admission was voluntary, in the 
sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the 
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair”); Richard 
A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In:  False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the 
Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 518 (“[C]hildren and juveniles . . . are also 
more predisposed to submissive behavior when questioned by police.”); Patrick M. 
McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions:  The Impermissibility of Police Deception 
in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 992–99 (2005) (reviewing the 
social science and biological research on juvenile decision-making and concluding 
that “children are most vulnerable to coercive police deception”). 
 196. Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda 
Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 66–67 (2008) (reviewing research on 
developmental issues relating to the ability of juveniles to make meaningful decisions 
regarding Miranda waiver, including tendencies to overweigh immediate gains and 
undervalue long-term negative consequences and diminished maturity of judgment). 
 197. See Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the 
Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 265–66 (2004) (“Mental illness makes people 
suggestible and susceptible to the slightest forms of pressure; coercion can take place 
much more easily, and in situations that a ‘normal’ person might not find coercive.  
The police can much more easily take advantage of the trust and dependence that 
develops between a confessor and confessant when questioning someone who is 
mentally ill.  This trust and dependence on the part of a suspect will make it 
impossible for him to understand the true, adversarial context of his interrogation 
and possible confession.”).  Note that the inquiry here of whether someone who is 
mentally ill or handicapped is particularly vulnerable to having her autonomy 
interests impinged by the State is different from the question of whether she has 
been subject to government coercion sufficient to give rise to a constitutional 
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mentally handicapped have difficulty recognizing when they are in an 
adversarial situation with authority figures and are particularly 
susceptible to agreeing to the wishes of those in positions of 
authority.198  The vulnerabilities of these classes of potential 
informants unquestionably arise from immutable personal 
characteristics and therefore deserve protection. 
Drug addicts and alcoholics also are particularly vulnerable to 
coercion and harm.  In addition to typical pressures felt by all 
potential informants from the threat of a lengthy prison sentence if 
they do not cooperate, potential informants who are addicts face the 
short-term concern of experiencing acute withdrawal symptoms 
should they refuse to cooperate and be jailed.199  The threat of 
withdrawal may be sufficiently severe to render the agreement to 
cooperate involuntary and to force such potential informants into 
unnecessarily dangerous situations.200  The difficult question, 
however, is whether the addict’s vulnerability to potential coercion is 
a sufficiently direct result of a knowing and voluntary choice, thus 
extinguishing her entitlement to society’s protection. 
Obviously, an individual’s addiction in almost every case is the 
result of a voluntary choice, at some point, to begin using intoxicants.  
Still, that choice also likely occurred a substantial time in the past, as 
addictions tend to develop over time.201  The more crucial issue is 
                                                          
violation.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that coercive 
police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a confession was not made 
voluntarily).  As the Court explained in Connelly, the constitutional question focuses 
on the actions of the police, not on whether an individual’s actions were the result of 
“‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the word.”  Id. at 170.  Thus, a mentally ill 
individual’s decision to assist the police may not be the product of her free will in 
some sense without the police’s conduct meeting the constitutional standard of 
government coercion. 
 198. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning:  The Constitution, Confessions, 
and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 511–13 (2002) (reviewing 
literature recognizing that the mentally handicapped are “unusually susceptible to 
the perceived wishes of authority figures,” “are unable to discern when they are in an 
adversarial situation, especially with police officers,” and often “overrate their 
skills”). 
 199. Kevin Fiscella et al., Benign Neglect or Neglected Abuse:  Drug and Alcohol 
Withdrawal in U.S. Jails, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 129, 131 (2004) (“Acute drug and 
alcohol withdrawal is distinguished from most other medical conditions in that the 
onset of symptoms typically coincides with arrest and detention.”). 
 200. See Commonwealth v. Paszko, 461 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Mass. 1984) (collecting 
cases and recognizing that confessions made during drug withdrawal may be 
involuntary); Fiscella et al., supra note 199, at 131 (“The threat of withdrawal 
associated with continued detention can implicitly serve to coerce arrestees into 
providing information they might not otherwise volunteer.”); Douglas N. Husak, 
Addiction and Criminal Liability, 18 LAW & PHIL. 655, 658–59 (1999) (arguing that the 
pain caused by withdrawal could satisfy the threat of harm element of a duress 
defense to a charge of illegal drug use). 
 201. See Raymond Anton, Substance Abuse Is a Disease of the Human Brain:  Focus on 
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whether continued addiction is properly viewed as a voluntary choice.  
Scientific literature tends to view addiction as a disease and thus out 
of the addict’s control,202 though there are dissenting voices.203  
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, in striking down a statute 
criminalizing narcotics addiction, suggested in Robinson v. California204 
that it may support the disease model.205  Thus, support certainly 
exists for the conclusion that society has a duty to protect drug 
addicts from the vulnerability that arises from their addiction.206 
The potential informant who is intoxicated at the time she is asked 
to cooperate also presents a thorny problem.  Intoxication can cause 
both cognitive and volitional impairments, leading the intoxicated 
individual to misunderstand what is occurring and to be less able to 
control her actions.207  As a result, the intoxicated potential informant 
is vulnerable to coercion by State agents to cooperate in situations 
where the resulting danger may have dissuaded her had she been 
sober.  But should this vulnerability be protected?  Put another way, 
did the potential informant choose to suffer the vulnerabilities of 
intoxication on the given occasion? 
As noted above, the scientific community largely views addiction as 
a disease that impairs the volitional capacity of the addict or 
alcoholic, thus making it difficult for her not to abuse the object of 
                                                          
Alcohol, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 735, 737 (2010) (reporting that alcoholism, for 
example, develops slowly, over the course of ten or even twenty years); Alan I. 
Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCI. 45, 46 (1997) (explaining 
that drug abuse causes persuasive changes to brain function that last long after the 
period of addiction). 
 202. See David M. Eagleman et al., Why Neuroscience Matters for Rational Drug Policy, 
11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 7, 15–19 (2010) (explaining that brain dysfunction 
eventually impairs impulse control and the ability to act volitionally); Fentiman, supra 
note 99, at 234 & n.4 (reiterating the perception that drug addicts are the 
“choiceless victims of their illness,” including the concept of people who behave 
compulsively despite adverse consequences). 
 203. See Fentiman, supra note 99, at 246–47 (discussing recent research suggesting 
that continued addiction is the result, at least in part, of the individual’s failure to 
make the choice to stop using the addictive good). 
 204. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 205. See id. at 666–67 (likening a statute that criminalized narcotic addiction to 
one that would outlaw mental illness and holding that imprisonment under the 
addiction statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 
 206. As noted supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text, the entitlement of a 
given vulnerability to protection is often a complex normative question.  It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to resolve that question in an area as hotly contested as drug 
addiction. 
 207. See Cynthia Calkins Mercado et al., Decision-Making About Volitional Impairment 
in Sexually Violent Predators, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 589 (2006) (“[C]onsiderable 
physiological and neuroscience research seems to support a link between alcohol 
and substance use and impairment in the inhibitory and activational aspects of 
behavioral control.”); Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal 
Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 405, 429 (1988) (explaining that consuming high 
quantities of alcohol reduces behavioral inhibitions). 
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the addiction.208  Nevertheless, difficulty in controlling one’s actions is 
not the same as an inability to do so, and the decision to abuse on a 
given occasion is volitional despite the influence of addiction.209  For 
example, even if a cocaine addict uses cocaine in response to an 
incredibly strong desire, the decision to use is still a choice, and it is 
one undertaken with full knowledge of its impact on the addict’s 
cognitive and volitional abilities.210 
In this vein, substantive criminal law provides little leeway to 
addicts.  Addiction generally provides no defense to charges of illegal 
intoxication,211 and voluntary intoxication is rarely a defense to any 
crime, even if the defendant is an addict.212  Similarly, those 
recovering from addiction are entitled to protection from 
employment discrimination, but those currently taking illegal drugs 
are not.213 
This analysis thus suggests a meaningful distinction between 
intoxication and addiction.  Both result from an individual’s 
voluntary choice, but the decision that led to the addiction is 
sufficiently distant in time that the individual can no longer be said to 
have voluntarily subjected herself to the vulnerabilities arising from 
it.  On the other hand, the decision to be intoxicated on a given 
occasion, though possibly influenced by addiction, is recent enough 
that the individual is responsible for knowingly making herself 
vulnerable to harm.  Consequently, an addict deserves protection 
                                                          
 208. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (exploring addiction as an organic 
dysfunction rather than the mischievous result of poor decision-making). 
 209. See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 184–85 (2006) (arguing that analogies that presuppose 
mechanistic behavior mischaracterize strong addictive desires by mistaking extreme 
difficulty of impulse control for physical lack of it). 
 210. See id. at 193 (highlighting the fact that addicts have lucid thoughts both 
before and during addiction and almost always remain cognizant of the risks to 
decision-making). 
 211. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion) (“We are 
unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the current state of medical 
knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer 
from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they 
are utterly unable to control their performance of either or both of these acts and 
thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication.”). 
 212. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Recreational Drug Regulation:  A Plea for 
Responsibility, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 117, 122–26 (discussing why addiction does not 
constitute a defense and concluding that the ultimate choice to seek treatment 
theoretically remains available). 
 213. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:  Judicial 
Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 
78 OR. L. REV. 27, 46 (1999) (noting that the ADA’s “safe harbor” clause does not 
apply to people “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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from vulnerabilities arising from her addiction, but not from her 
immediate intoxication. 
IV. PATERNALISM AND MORAL HARM 
The preceding account provides a portrait of the vulnerabilities 
faced by potential informants in the current environment of non-
regulation.  Efforts to protect informants against vulnerabilities to 
harm—some of which will be advocated for in more detail below—
will inevitably restrict, either directly or indirectly, the ability of some 
individuals to become informants.214  Any such reforms thus raise 
additional autonomy concerns for the potential informant and are 
paternalistic to the extent that they are justified in whole or in part by 
the claim that they protect informant interests from harm.215 
This conflict between the potential informant’s interest in being 
free from harm and her autonomy interests highlights two issues.  
First, not all kinds of harm are equal.  In particular, societal 
protection against moral harm interferes doubly with individual 
autonomy:  not only do these protections inhibit the individual’s 
ability to assess her own personal tolerance for risk and harm, but 
they also impose majoritarian moral judgments on the individual.  
Second, society must formulate some methodology to weigh the 
competing interests.  This Article addresses these questions in turn. 
A. The Problem of Moral Harm 
Potential informants are vulnerable to physical, social, and moral 
harms as a result of their cooperation with law enforcement.216  Moral 
harm is different from physical and social harm, however.  “Harm,” 
the prevention of which might justify restrictions on an individual’s 
autonomy, requires some injury to an interest of the harmed.217  With 
                                                          
 214. Of course, a variety of other grounds unrelated to the specific interests of 
informants may also justify reforms of the informant system:  minimizing inaccurate 
outcomes, increasing law enforcement effectiveness, improving the perception of law 
enforcement in communities, and minimizing law enforcement corruption.  See 
generally NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 175–200 (proposing reforms on these grounds). 
 215. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (last updated June 1, 2010) 
(defining paternalism broadly as “the interference of a state or an individual with 
another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the 
person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm”).  Though the 
term “paternalism” often carries a negative connotation, the concept itself is non-
normative.  Id. 
 216. See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text (discussing various types of 
vulnerabilities to which informants are susceptible). 
 217. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  HARM TO 
OTHERS 33–36 (1984) (concluding, after surveying various senses of “harm,” that 
criminal law should address only wrongs that also set back interests). 
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respect to physical harm, the interest at issue is straightforward and 
universal:  the interest in one’s physical health and life.218  The 
interests injured by social harm, as defined by this Article,219 are 
similarly universal:  the interests in one’s psychological well-being, 
ability to maintain social relationships, and minimal economic 
stability.220 
On the other hand, the interest threatened by moral harm is one’s 
interest in being good.221  Unlike one’s interest in avoiding physical 
injury or death, or in making a minimal living, one’s interest in being 
good is highly individualized.  Disagreements will arise both over 
whether a particular activity is in fact morally harmful to the actor222 
and over how much moral harm an activity will cause.223  As a result, 
attempts to protect an individual from moral harm impose a greater 
restraint on her liberty than efforts to protect her from physical or 
social harm.  Not only do such attempts interfere with the individual’s 
freedom of action, they also impinge on her entitlement to assess 
what constitutes morally harmful activity.224  Moreover, attempting to 
protect against moral harms runs the risk of imposing an inaccurate 
moral judgment.225  In other words, when two groups differ about 
whether a particular activity causes moral harm to the actor, there is a 
danger in imposing the will of one over the other in that the winning 
side may simply be wrong.226 
In the context of informants, the issue of moral harm is particularly 
complicated.  For instance, the informant may perceive his 
cooperation as disloyal, and thus immoral, and suffer “moral harm” 
                                                          
 218. See id. at 37 (listing possible welfare interests broadly distinguishable as either 
physical or emotional). 
 219. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (discussing social harms that 
may result from an individual’s cooperation with police). 
 220. See FEINBERG, supra note 217, at 37 (sorting interests broadly as “welfare” and 
“ulterior,” with the former being the most important). 
 221. Id. at 69–70. 
 222. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING 308 (1988) (discussing moral relativism). 
 223. See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1022–
24 (2010) (criticizing attempts to correlate the degree of moral disapprobation with 
the allocation of resources). 
 224. See FEINBERG, supra note 222, at 309 (“When we give moral license to state 
enforcement of the majority will, overruling individual autonomy even in matters 
that do not violate the rights of others, that is unfair in itself . . . .”). 
 225. Id. at 310. 
 226. These concerns about moral harm therefore are not morally relativistic; 
rather, they recognize that genuine disagreements exist about the moral 
wrongfulness of certain activities and place substantial value on individuals’ interests 
in resolving these disagreements.  See id. at 308–10 (suggesting that because 
individuals disagree about moral norms, legal enforcement of moral norms is 
unfair). 
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as a result.227  But the judgment of whether an individual has acted 
disloyally is highly individualized.  Thus, it is possible for an 
individual informant to feel she has acted disloyally when mainstream 
society does not agree228 and for society more generally to perceive 
cooperation as disloyal even though the informant does not agree.229  
Assuming the majority outlaws cooperation that it perceives to be 
morally wrong, such a law would not prevent the informant in the 
former case from cooperating and suffering moral harm.  In contrast, 
the law would prevent the latter informant from cooperating even 
though she would suffer no such harm, thus impinging on her 
autonomy interests without any commensurate benefit. 
Moral harm also may arise from requiring the informant to engage 
in more serious criminal conduct than that she is accused of 
committing, thus desensitizing her to greater criminality.230  The 
extent of this moral harm is also highly individualized.  Some 
informants may be minor criminals forced to commit much more 
serious offenses, while others may be hardened criminals against 
whom the police only have evidence of minor offenses.  Moreover, 
some minor criminals may have little interest in their own goodness, 
while some who have committed more serious offenses may 
nonetheless maintain strong moral boundaries that are subject to 
corrosion.  Thus, a law targeting this kind of harm by forbidding the 
use of those charged with minor crimes as informants would fail to 
protect some informants who would suffer moral harm and protect 
others who are not at risk.  For these reasons, protections against 
moral harm should be avoided, or, if they are deemed necessary, such 
protections must be exceedingly well-tailored. 
                                                          
 227. See Simons, supra note 13, 28–29 (stating that even though informants’ 
actions benefit society, there is nevertheless a disdain for their own willingness to 
betray others). 
 228. The “Stop Snitching” phenomenon in some high-crime communities 
provides an example of this disconnect.  In such communities, individuals who 
cooperate against other community members often perceive their cooperation to be 
immoral, while members of mainstream society believe that cooperation is proper.  
See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 21–27) (noting that when a witness in a high-
crime community refuses to be a “snitch,” mainstream society views this as disloyal in 
regards to the enforcement of criminal law). 
 229. For instance, an informant who feels no special obligation to her son will not 
feel that she has been disloyal by cooperating with the police against him.  But 
society more generally will believe that the informant has been disloyal because of 
the widely-held belief about the obligations of a mother to her son.  See id. 
(manuscript at 10–11) (utilizing the normative view that a son and a mother have a 
certain relationship where there is expected to be a high degree of loyalty). 
 230. See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
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B. How Much Paternalism? 
Turning then to the question of whether and to what extent 
paternalism is appropriate, answers run along a spectrum.231  At one 
end, libertarians embrace autonomy above all else; consequently, 
they deplore paternalism.232  At the other end are so-called “hard” 
paternalists, who would permit the government to prevent dangerous 
but self-regarding activities, even when such activities are conducted 
with the free and informed choice of the actor.233  A middle ground is 
found in “soft” paternalism, which allows the State to prevent 
dangerous, self-regarding behavior only when it is non-voluntary or 
when intervention is necessary to establish whether the action in 
question is voluntary.234 
To further understand these distinctions, take John Stuart Mill’s 
classic example of a traveler with whom we cannot communicate, and 
who is about to walk across a damaged bridge.235  A strict libertarian 
would oppose any government interference on the ground that the 
traveler is bound to harm no one but herself and is free to do so, 
while a paternalist would believe that stopping her is appropriate to 
prevent injury.236  If, after the person is stopped, it is revealed that she 
is both competent and aware of the danger but nevertheless wishes to 
proceed, the soft paternalist would permit her to do so because her 
assumption of the risk is voluntary.237  Meanwhile, a hard paternalist 
would argue that stopping even the knowledgeable and competent 
traveler may be permissible in some circumstances.238 
In the case of the potential criminal informant, the strict 
libertarian, anti-paternalistic view is unsuited to the importance of the 
rights at issue.  Unlike a commercial free-market transaction 
                                                          
 231. For a more complete discussion of definitions and perspectives on legal 
paternalism, see 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  HARM TO 
SELF 3-26 (1986). 
 232. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2003) (describing traditional 
libertarianism). 
 233. See Joel Feinberg, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 137–38 
(Donald M. Borchert ed., Supp. 1996). 
 234. Id. at 138.  The soft paternalist’s consideration of voluntariness includes 
contemplation of conditions affecting an actor’s capacity, such as the influence of 
drugs, age, or mental impairment.  See FEINBERG, supra note 231, at 12 (noting that 
soft paternalism stresses the voluntariness of a person’s actions). 
 235. See MILL’S ON LIBERTY:  A CRITICAL GUIDE 215 (C. L. Ten ed., 2008) 
(explaining that a public officer could stop a man from crossing an unsafe bridge 
because the man’s desire would not be to fall off the bridge). 
 236. See Dworkin, supra note 215 (distinguishing between the hard and soft 
paternalist in the context of John Stuart Mills’ bridge example). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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involving the sale of goods, the potential informant is engaged with 
the State in a negotiation that implicates her freedom, her right to 
trial, her right to counsel, and her safety.239  When the criminal 
informant agrees to cooperate, she foregoes those protections, at 
least temporarily,240 and is placed in a position where she must choose 
either to collaborate with the State or to face criminal prosecution.  
At a minimum, some guarantee should be made that the informant’s 
decision to cooperate is made freely and voluntarily. 
The protections provided to the plea-bargaining defendant suggest 
society’s unease with a purely laissez-faire approach to the waiver of 
fundamental rights.241  Prior to a defendant pleading guilty, she must 
be provided an opportunity to speak to counsel, and the court 
considering the plea must make a record that establishes, at least at 
some minimum level, that the pleading defendant has waived her 
rights knowingly and voluntarily.242  Of course, a strict libertarian 
might argue that the informant’s freedom of choice is of the utmost 
importance precisely because such foundational rights are at issue.  
Yet, in the plea bargaining context, even libertarian academics have 
recognized that “[l]iberty is too important to be allocated by 
unregulated bargaining.  The potential for irrationality and mistake 
to work irrevocable, life-destroying injustice is too high not to police 
the bargain.” 243 
On the other hand, a hard paternalist response—namely, a 
complete ban on the use of criminal informants to protect informant 
interests—also goes too far.  To justify a flat ban, all informants 
                                                          
 239. See Rich, supra note 21, at 695 (noting that cooperation agreements lack the 
safeguards that attach to a formal plea and do not involve judicial oversight). 
 240. Should the informant fail to cooperate to the State’s satisfaction and is 
prosecuted, these rights will not have been waived. 
 241. Indeed, the fact that certain fundamental rights, such as the Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and the Thirteenth 
Amendment right to be free of involuntary servitude, cannot be waived suggests that 
a certain level of paternalism pervades our constitutional government.  See Anthony 
T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780 (1983) 
(arguing that restrictions on one’s freedom of contract, including one’s ability to 
enter into a contract of self-enslavement, are best justified by the threat that such 
contracts pose to “the promisor’s integrity or self-respect”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
Education Off the Grid:  Constitutional Restraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 
153–54 (2008) (stating that waivers of constitutional rights should not be permissible 
when they do harm to broader social functions and government protections).  But see 
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1387–88 (1984) (arguing that the nonwaivability of these 
rights is better justified on non-paternalist grounds). 
 242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1971) 
(affirming Rule 11’s requirement that states a federal court must develop, on the 
record, the factual basis for the defendant’s plea). 
 243. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 111, at 1930. 
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would have to suffer a net harm as a result of cooperation.  This 
seems unlikely.  Many informants successfully cooperate in exchange 
for promised leniency without suffering any physical harm.244  
Moreover, some informants successfully cooperate with law 
enforcement without their cooperation being discovered.245  These 
informants will not be subject to the social harm that accompanies 
the discovery of cooperation.246  Finally, the moral harms potentially 
suffered by an informant are highly individualized and ill-suited to 
government protection.247  Consequently, no matter how strongly or 
weakly one values an informant’s autonomy interests, at least in some 
cases the benefits to the informant of permitting cooperation will 
outweigh the harm. 
Alternatively, a flat ban could be justified if the aggregate harm 
suffered by all informants as a result of cooperation outweighs the 
aggregate benefit and if it is impossible to tailor reforms with greater 
precision to ameliorate the harms without eradicating the benefits.  
The first condition requires a balancing of the harms and benefits to 
informants that is a difficult, if not impossible, normative and 
empirical task well beyond the scope of this Article.  Fortunately, 
reforms can be crafted that might alleviate the harmful impact of the 
informant system on those criminal informants most likely to suffer a 
net harm while preserving the net benefit to the remainder.  These 
                                                          
 244. Despite the numerous published reports of informants who are injured or 
killed as a result of their cooperation with police, those reports pale in comparison to 
the hundreds of thousands of informants who are estimated to be active at any given 
time.  See Natapoff, supra note 16, at 657 (noting that there are hundreds of 
thousands of informants who are guarded with protection and as a result, harm 
would be hard to inflict upon them).  Moreover, with respect to the question of 
whether informants actually receive leniency, a large percentage of sentenced federal 
defendants have been granted substantial assistance departures under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCES RELATIVE TO THE 
GUIDELINE RANGE BY EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY (2010), available at 
www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/ 
2010/Table27.pdf (reporting that 9421 federal defendants, or 11.5% of all 
defendants, received downward departures for substantial assistance). 
 245. As with all empirical matters regarding informants, it is impossible to discern 
precisely how often an informant’s cooperation is not discovered.  Nonetheless, law 
enforcement guidelines forbidding agents from revealing the identity of informants 
suggest that it should not be a rare occurrence.  See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 189, 
at 6, 11–13 (providing protections for criminal informants, including confidentiality 
and possible immunity, that can be granted if informants provide truthful 
information). 
 246. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (noting that criminal 
informants also risk social harm in addition to any physical harm that may be 
incurred). 
 247. See supra notes 216–40 and accompanying text (stating that a moral harm 
may be suffered by an informant resulting from societal pressures, both in their own 
community and in mainstream society). 
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reforms, set forth below,248 largely take the form of so-called “soft” 
paternalistic measures aimed at enhancing the voluntariness of the 
decisions made by potential informants. 
V. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
Despite society’s general disapproval and law enforcement’s 
disdain, the interests of criminal informants are not entirely 
unprotected.  That said, available safeguards protect only a small 
minority of criminal informants effectively, and such safeguards 
minimally shield the interests of the vast majority.  Moreover, most 
are unintended side-effects of law enforcement policies created to 
serve law enforcement interests and thus continue only so long as 
they forward those interests. 
A. Witness Protection Programs 
The most widely-known protection available to criminal informants 
are the witness protection programs found in many jurisdictions.  Of 
these, the most comprehensive and best-funded is the federal Witness 
Security Program.249  It empowers the United States Attorney General 
to protect and relocate those individuals, including criminals, who 
might serve as witnesses in the prosecution of any “serious offense.”250  
Among other things, the Attorney General may provide the witness 
and her family with a new identity, housing, employment, and cash 
payments, and may refuse to disclose the identity or location of the 
protected individuals.251  Various state governments also have witness 
protection programs that can be used to protect criminal 
informants.252 
Witness protection programs are limited in the protection that they 
provide to informants in three ways.  First, they protect only a small 
minority of cooperating witnesses.253  These witnesses tend to be 
                                                          
 248. See infra Part VI (proposing reforms that increase the information available to 
potential informants and protect their ability to choose whether to cooperate). 
 249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521 (2006) (allowing for the provision of relocation and 
protective services by the Attorney General to potential witnesses). 
 250. Id. § 3521(a)(1). 
 251. Id. § 3521(b)(1). 
 252. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 14020 (West 2011) (creating a witness relocation 
and assistance program); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-30-1 (2011) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 
52-35 (2012) (same). 
 253. See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards:  Effective Law 
Enforcement Tools in the “War” Against Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1077 (2002) 
(“While the Federal Witness Protection Program presents an opportunity to grant 
noncitizens the right to live and work in the United States, it is numerically 
restricted, expensive, and may not suit the needs of many individuals who cooperate 
with law enforcement.”).  For instance, in the forty years since its enactment in 1971, 
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“high-value” informants, i.e. those who can provide substantial 
information relevant to particularly serious prosecutions.254  Second, 
witness protection programs protect only the person and immediate 
family of “witnesses,” meaning those informants who are expected to 
testify in court.255  Many active criminal informants are never 
expected to testify, however, and thus are ineligible for protection.256  
Third, witness protection programs provide only physical protection 
to informants.  They are not designed to protect against informants 
from the potential moral and social harms of cooperation.257 
B. Internal Law Enforcement Policies 
The most robust law enforcement guidelines governing the use of 
criminal informants are those issued by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and applicable to federal law enforcement agencies.258  The 
                                                          
the Witness Security Program has provided protection to more than 8300 witnesses 
and their family members.  See U.S. MARSHALS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT 
SHEET:  WITNESS SECURITY (2011), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/ 
factsheets/witsec-2011.pdf.  The California Witness Relocation and Protection 
Program, one of the most prolific state witness protection programs, serves at most 
hundreds of witnesses each year.  See CAL. S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S. 2007-594, 
1st Sess., at 4–5 (reporting that 388 new witness protection cases were opened during 
fiscal year 2004–2005, according to the Department of Justice).  The Massachusetts 
Witness Protection Program protected 167 witnesses in its first three years.  MASS. 
EXEC. OFFICE OF PUB. SAFETY & SEC., THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS WITNESS 
PROTECTION PROGRAM:  AN OVERVIEW OF CASES DURING FISCAL YEAR 2007, 2008, AND 
2009, at 7 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/fy-09-witness-
protection-analysis-no-appendix.pdf.  Though not insubstantial, the number of 
protected witnesses, many of whom may not be informants, pales in comparison to 
the estimated hundreds of thousands of criminal informants who are active at any 
given time.  See Natapoff, supra note 16, at 657 (noting that many of the defendants 
who cooperate receive no credit at all). 
 254. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521(c) (requiring the Attorney General to assess, inter alia, 
“the seriousness of the investigation or case in which the person’s information or 
testimony has been or will be provided” and “the relative importance of the person’s 
testimony”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 14023 (“The Attorney General shall give priority to 
matters involving organized crime, gang activities, drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, and cases involving a high degree of risk to the witness.”); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 52-35 (limiting protection to those who provide information about serious violent 
felonies, felony drug offenses, domestic violence, and certain sexual assaults). 
 255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521(c) (requiring the Attorney General to consider the value 
of the potential witness’ testimony); id. § 3521(d)(1) (requiring the Attorney 
General to obtain the agreement of the witness or potential witness “to testify in . . . 
all appropriate proceedings”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 14021(a) (defining “witness” to 
mean only those persons reasonably expected to be summoned to testify in a 
criminal matter). 
 256. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 18–23 (detailing the processes involved in 
police recruitment of informants and asserting that a great deal of prosecutorial 
discretion is exercised over the informant’s ultimate fate). 
 257. Indeed, to the extent that informants are uprooted from their communities, 
moved to new locations, and provided new identities through a witness protection 
program, the social harm they suffer is substantial. 
 258. DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 189. 
RICH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:14 PM 
2012] PROTECTING ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 1481 
DOJ Guidelines provide some protections for criminal informants.  
They impose a duty of candor on agents in their dealings with 
informants and forbid law enforcement agents from promising 
immunity or giving the erroneous impression that they have the 
authority to do so.259  Moreover, in recruiting a potential informant, 
an agent must consider factors including the person’s age, her history 
of substance abuse, and the risk of physical harm to the informant 
should she cooperate.260  A supervisor must then approve the agent’s 
suitability determination.261  After the informant has agreed to 
cooperate, the agent is required to review the terms of the agreement 
with her and in the presence of a witness.262  These terms include a 
promise that the government will “strive to protect the [informant’s] 
identity” and the recognition that the agent is not authorized to 
promise the informant immunity.263  Finally, when deciding whether 
to authorize the informant’s engagement in criminal activity, the 
relevant law enforcement agent must consider, inter alia, the 
anticipated extent of the informant’s participation in the activity and 
the risk that the informant will suffer physical injury.264 
On their face, these protections appear substantial.  By forcing 
agents to consider the potential harm to the informant from 
cooperation generally and from engagement in authorized criminal 
activity specifically, the guidelines protect the informant’s interest in 
avoiding physical harm.  By requiring consideration of the 
informant’s age and substance abuse history, they permit recognition 
that young or addicted informants may be less capable of making an 
informed decision to cooperate.  Similarly, the duty of candor, the 
ban on false promises of immunity, and the requirement that the 
terms of cooperation be reviewed with the informant enhance the 
likelihood that the informant’s decision to cooperate is made 
knowingly and voluntarily.  The requirement that decisions about 
informant suitability be reviewed by a supervisor ensures that the 
guidelines are followed. 
The DOJ Guidelines provide only the opportunity for the protection 
of informant interests, however, and the realities of law enforcement 
discourage agents from prioritizing those interests.265  Though some 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 5. 
 260. Id. at 8–9. 
 261. Id. at 8. 
 262. Id. at 11. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 21. 
 265. Moreover, the DOJ Guidelines explicitly state that they create no right of 
enforcement by confidential informants.  Id. at 7. 
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of the guideline requirements are strict, such as the prohibition on 
offers of immunity, most leave substantial discretion to law 
enforcement agents.  For instance, the guidelines list seventeen 
factors to be considered in determining the suitability of a potential 
informant, only two of which suggest concern for informant 
vulnerabilities.266  No standard is provided for how those factors 
should be weighed, and most focus the agent’s attention on the 
informant’s potential utility to law enforcement.267  Likewise, the 
guidelines require an agent to consider seven factors in deciding 
whether to authorize the informant to engage in criminal activity, 
only one of which touches on the informant’s interests, and the 
guidelines provide no standards for how those factors should be 
weighed.268 
At the same time that the guidelines leave substantial discretion in 
the hands of federal agents, those agents are subject to pressures to 
gather evidence, make cases, and obtain convictions.269  For instance, 
the most common measure of an agent’s performance is her 
clearance rate, the rate at which she manages to satisfactorily close 
reported crimes, either through apprehension of the perpetrator or a 
determination that the offender cannot be apprehended.270  These 
clearance rates matter not only to the agent’s direct supervisor; they 
also are reported publicly and can form a basis for public pressure on 
the agency.271  Additionally, limited resources put pressure on agents 
to clear cases quickly and efficiently.272  Considered together, these 
pressures suggest that when agents are faced with a close call over the 
suitability of a vulnerable informant or the potential risks to an 
informant of authorizing criminal activity, they will be inclined to 
make the decision in favor of using the informant or authorizing the 
activity.  Indeed, the FBI has come under fire for its persistent failure 
                                                          
 266. See id. at 8–9 (requiring consideration of the potential informant’s age and 
substance abuse history). 
 267. For instance, the guidelines require consideration of the potential 
informant’s credibility, criminal history, the relevance of the information she could 
provide, and the risk that she might adversely impact a current or future 
investigations.  Id. 
 268. Id. at 21. 
 269. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 322–27 (describing the institutional 
pressures on police to make arrests and obtain convictions); see also David W. 
Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Police Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 679, 721–22 (2003) (theorizing that utility-maximization encourages 
police to prioritize making drug arrests). 
 270. Findley & Scott, supra note 269, at 325–26. 
 271. See id. at 324 (concluding that police administrators pressure officers to solve 
as many cases as possible so the statistics released will bolster public opinion). 
 272. Id. at 325. 
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to abide by the DOJ Guidelines.273  Finally, institutional pressures to 
favor law enforcement interests over informant interests are 
reinforced by the underlying distaste many agents feel toward those 
criminals who are willing to “snitch.”274 
Moreover, as noted previously, the DOJ Guidelines are the most 
detailed law enforcement regulations on informant use.  In many 
jurisdictions, no guidelines exist at all.  In others, guidelines are little 
more than recordkeeping regulations with no provision for 
consideration of informant interests.275  Others follow the DOJ 
approach of suggesting some consideration of the risks that 
informants face but leave discretion in the hands of law enforcement 
to ultimately weigh the importance of those risks.276  Finally, very few 
jurisdictions place hard limitations on informant use.277  As a result, 
law enforcement agents in most jurisdictions have even more 
discretion in the recruitment and handling of informants than 
federal agents.  In such a flexible, discretionary environment, the 
                                                          
 273. See Dan Eggen, FBI Agents Often Break Informant Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/ 
AR2005091201825.html (reporting on an internal investigation of compliance with 
DOJ rules for handling confidential informants that found violations in eighty-seven 
percent of cases); see also ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 30–32 (reporting results of a 
law enforcement survey in which a majority of officers reported being unaware of the 
existence of relevant policies on informant handling or failure to abide by them). 
 274. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text (noting that many prosecutors 
and police officers view criminal informants with disdain and low regard). 
 275. See, e.g., Omer Gillham, TPD Releases Drug-Case Policies, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 8, 
2010, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid= 
20100808 _11_A1_USAtto839786&allcom=1 (setting forth the informant guidelines 
of the Tulsa, Oklahoma police department). 
 276. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 914.28(5) (2011) (requiring, among other things, that 
agents consider the age and maturity of a potential informant and the risk of physical 
harm during the recruitment process). 
 277. Inflexible limits on informant use are difficult to enact because they 
inevitably face opposition from law enforcement groups that contend that tightened 
restrictions on law enforcement discretion will result in less effective law 
enforcement.  For instance, Florida legislators introduced a bill in 2009 that would 
have required that potential informants be given an opportunity to consult with 
counsel and forbade the use of certain classes of informants.  H.R. 271, 2009 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009).  The more restrictive provisions of the bill met substantial law 
enforcement opposition on the grounds that they would impede investigations and 
endanger informants by involving individuals outside of law enforcement in their 
recruitment and use.  See FLA. H.R., STAFF ANALYSIS, H. 2009-271, at 6 (Feb. 20, 2009) 
(reporting criticism from the Florida Sheriff’s Association and the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement).   As passed, the bill stripped away any strict limits 
on the use of informants.  Jennifer Portman, Crist Signs “Rachel’s Law,” TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT, May 8, 2009, at 1A.  The only major jurisdiction that imposes any firm 
limits on who can be an informant is California, which forbids the use of criminal 
informants under the age of twelve and allows the use of criminal informants under 
the age of eighteen only with court approval.  See Dennis, supra note 36, at 1160–61 
(explaining that a child must be found by a court to have voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently agreed to serve as an informant). 
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institutional pressures to make arrests, coupled with the general 
distaste of informants, are even more likely to overwhelm any 
concern individual agents may feel about informant interests.278 
C. Legal Action 
Successful civil claims by injured informants may deter government 
action that puts them at risk.  Such claims typically arise in one of two 
ways.  First, a criminal informant who has suffered injuries as a result 
of her cooperation with law enforcement may allege a federal 
constitutional claim; in addition, such an informant may allege a 
federal or state law tort claim, based in statute or the common law.279  
Second, a criminal informant may claim improper police conduct as 
a defense to criminal liability or cite it as a circumstance entitling her 
to a lesser sentence.280 
1. Civil claims 
Though civil suits by informants against government agencies and 
agents can be successful,281 they face significant legal hurdles.  With 
respect to statutory or common-law claims, most jurisdictions place 
substantial limits on official liability.282  At the federal level, the 
Federal Tort Claims Act provides for a limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity by which the federal government is liable in tort “in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to 
judgment or for punitive damages.”283  Moreover, the Act includes a 
discretionary function exception, which excludes claims “based upon 
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
                                                          
 278. Cf. JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 93–94 (1996) (arguing that police 
discretion must be restricted to comply with broader societal norms and calling for 
an administrative rule to monitor police discretion). 
 279. See, e.g., Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(affirming a judgment awarding $530,000 in compensatory damages under the 
Survival and Wrongful Death Acts in favor of the family of an informant who died 
while engaged in drug buy planned at behest of police); McIntyre v. United States, 
447 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding federal government liable under 
Federal Tort Claims Act for the wrongful death of criminal informant). 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting 
that a defendant argued that an indictment should be dismissed because it alleged 
crimes that had been authorized by federal agents); People v. Ruggiero, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
226, 227–28 (App. Div. 2011) (remanding for resentencing upon finding that the 
prosecution unilaterally changed the terms of the cooperation agreement). 
 281. See McIntyre, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (awarding over $3 million to family of 
informant); see also Butera, 235 F.3d at 641 (affirming an award of more than 
$500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages). 
 282. See Rich, supra note 21, at 701 n.123 (describing cases which limit police 
liability). 
 283. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
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discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved 
be abused.”284  State governments have enacted similar limitations on 
the liability of their agencies and officials.285 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the discretionary function 
exception to protect federal officials from liability so long as they do 
not run afoul of a “federal statute, regulation, or policy [that] 
specifically prescribes a course of action . . . to follow”286 and their 
actions and decisions are “based on considerations of public 
policy.”287  With respect to the first requirement for the application of 
the exception, the use of informants is an area in which firm policies 
are few and substantive discretion lies with law enforcement agents.288  
As for the second requirement, courts have found that decisions on 
how to handle investigations and protect informants are based on 
considerations of public policy.289  As a result, informants who allege 
tort claims arising from injuries suffered while cooperating frequently 
find their claims barred.290 
Informants making constitutional claims typically allege substantive 
due process violations.291  The first hurdle to these claims is the 
                                                          
 284. Id. § 2680(a). 
 285. For state limitations on punitive damages, see, for example, HAW. REV. STAT. § 
662-2 (2011); IOWA CODE § 669.4 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
522(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012).  With respect to state analogues of the discretionary 
function exception, see, for example, ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(2) (2012); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 50-21-24(2) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(1) (2012); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 258, § 10(b) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032(2) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
32-12.1-03(3)(d) (2011). 
 286. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). 
 287. Id. at 323 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537). 
 288. See supra notes 269–78 and accompanying text (noting that there are few 
guidelines in regulating informant use, and that the DOJ has published the most 
comprehensive guidelines). 
 289. Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting other 
circuit court cases where the treatment of an informant was highly dependent on 
public policy). 
 290. See, e.g., id. at 934–35 (dismissing a Federal Torts Claims Act action on 
ground that law enforcement’s decision of when to arrest target of investigation falls 
within the discretionary function exception); Vaughn v. City of Athens, 176 F. App’x 
974, 979 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (dismissing claims under discretionary 
function exception where the police used the arrestee, who was later murdered, to 
arrange drug buys); Best v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260–61 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(dismissing a claim on the ground that law enforcement’s decision about how to 
protect the informant fell within the discretionary authority exception).  But see Litif 
v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 2d 60, 81 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that the 
discretionary function exception did not apply to shield an FBI agent’s decision to 
leak the name of an informant). 
 291. See Rich, supra note 21, at 701–02 (explaining that an injured informant is 
more likely to succeed with a substantive due process claim founded upon the Fifth 
or Fourteenth Amendments). 
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general bar on constitutional claims for injuries inflicted by third 
parties.292  Informants attempt to overcome this bar by arguing that 
the government is liable under the “special relationship” and “state-
created danger” doctrines.293  Some circuits reject these claims 
outright when they are brought by informants on the ground that 
informants voluntarily assume any risks that arise from cooperating 
with the government.294  Even in those jurisdictions where such claims 
could succeed, the plaintiff still must establish that the government 
conduct met the substantive due process “shocks the conscience” 
standard.295  This standard is amorphous in any context,296 but in the 
informant arena, courts have been especially deferential to 
discretionary decisions by police.297  And even when police conduct 
might shock the conscience, qualified immunity poses another 
potential hurdle to recovery,298 albeit one that may diminish over 
time.299 
                                                          
 292. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 
(1989) (noting that the state has affirmative duties of care and protection only in 
limited circumstances under the Constitution). 
 293. Rich, supra note 21, at 702. 
 294. Id. at 703 n.132 (surveying cases where courts denied informants relief 
stemming from injuries sustained based on their role as informants). 
 295. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998) (defining the 
notion of “shocks the conscience” as being so vulgar and offensive as not to comply 
with traditional standards of decency). 
 296. See id. at 861–62 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the “shocks the 
conscience” test for permitting arbitrariness in judicial decision-making while 
forbidding it in executive or legislative action); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 
1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994) (calling the “shocks the conscience” test an “amorphous 
and imprecise inquiry”). 
 297. See Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that police actions in planning a sting that revealed an informant’s identity did not 
shock the conscience because it was the result of police decision-making that 
involved the balancing of concern for their own safety against concern for the 
informant’s). 
 298. See Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 647–52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(dismissing a substantive due process claim based on police failure to protect an 
informant from a state-created danger on the ground that, while a due process 
violation may have occurred, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because 
an informant’s right to be protected from such a danger was not clearly established). 
 299. Theoretically, as courts render decisions and the obligations of law 
enforcement agents with respect to informants become “clearly established,” the 
qualified immunity defense will no longer be available to those agents who fail to 
fulfill them.  See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (recognizing lower 
court discretion in deciding when to address constitutional questions in the qualified 
immunity context “so as to promote ‘the law’s elaboration from case to case’”) 
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).  In applying the qualified 
immunity doctrine, however, Supreme Court decisions suggest that the standard for 
demonstrating that a right has been clearly established is a stringent one that 
tolerates substantial errors in judgment by law enforcement.  See Andrew M. Siegel, 
The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the 
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1131 & n.123 (2006) (framing the 
qualified immunity doctrine as a product of judicial culture).  Coupled with this 
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2. Arguments in an informant’s criminal case 
Criminal informants also seek to protect their interests by raising 
claims of mistreatment in the context of any criminal charges 
brought against them.  These claims take the form of either a defense 
to liability or an argument for reductions in sentence.  With respect 
to the former, criminal informants assert the related affirmative 
defenses of public-authority and entrapment by estoppel.300  The 
public-authority defense requires the defendant to prove her 
reasonable reliance on a public official’s directive to engage in 
activity she knows to be illegal.301  Similarly, entrapment by estoppel 
requires that the defendant reasonably believed her conduct was 
legal because of an official statement of the law.302 
These defenses face both doctrinal and practical hurdles.  
Doctrinally, many jurisdictions will only allow these defenses if the 
official who allegedly empowered the defendant to engage in the 
illegal conduct had the actual authority to do so.303  The absence of 
                                                          
standard, the relatively low volume of substantive due process cases brought by 
informants suggests that qualified immunity will remain a significant hurdle to 
recovery for quite some time. 
 300. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3 (setting forth the required procedure for asserting 
the public-authority defense); United States v. Strahan, 565 F.3d 1047, 1051 (7th Cir. 
2009) (contrasting the public authority defense, which was claimed by the defendant, 
and entrapment by estoppel, which is available to “a defendant who believed his 
conduct legal because of an official’s statement of the law”); United States v. Giffen, 
473 F.3d 30, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the relationship between entrapment by 
estoppel and the public authority defense, the latter of which was claimed by the 
defendant, a government informant, for each of the crimes charged); United States 
v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference between the 
two defenses, and holding that the defendant had provided insufficient evidence to 
support either). 
 301. Strahan, 565 F.3d at 1051. 
 302. Id.; Achter, 52 F.3d at 755. 
 303. With respect to the public-authority defense, see Giffen, 473 F.3d at 39 
(holding that a valid assertion of public-authority defense requires that the public 
official who allegedly authorized conduct had actual authority to do so); United 
States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Pitt, 
193 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Achter, 52 F.3d at 755 (same); United States 
v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).  But see 
United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 872 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing pattern jury 
instructions on public-authority defense requiring only reasonable reliance on an 
official’s statement, not actual authorization to approve of criminal activity).  With 
regard to entrapment by estoppel, see United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466–67 
(5th Cir. 1996) (requiring actual authority to interpret the relevant statute before a 
defendant may claim entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 
1385 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 83–84 (2d Cir. 
1984) (same).  But see Pitt, 193 F.3d at 758–59 (noting that “[t]he defense of 
entrapment by estoppel turns on [the] credibility” of the government agent, and 
“shifts the focus from the conduct of the defendant to the conduct of the 
government”); United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(rejecting as irrelevant the government’s argument that the defendant could not 
claim entrapment by estoppel because the official in question did not have authority 
to authorize proscribed activity). 
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informant guidelines creates a practical hurdle to proving such 
authority, as public officials typically are not empowered to sanction 
criminal conduct without explicit authorization.304  Moreover, even 
when an informant can claim that a public official had the power to 
authorize the relevant criminal conduct, the issue of whether the 
official in fact did so is often a disputed question of fact that calls for 
the jury to evaluate the relative credibility of the official and the 
informant.305  A criminal informant is unlikely to prevail in such a 
credibility contest.306 
Criminal informants also argue their entitlement to the benefits of 
a cooperation agreement—namely, leniency in a criminal case—
under what is essentially a breach of contract theory.  Though these 
arguments are sometimes successful,307 formal cooperation 
agreements typically leave prosecutors with broad discretion to 
decide whether an informant’s efforts merit leniency, and courts 
                                                          
 304. For instance, the DOJ Guidelines on the use of informants authorize agents 
to sanction criminal activity in only very limited situations and only with the written 
and advance approval of a supervisor.  See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at 20 
(requiring that authorization of illegal activity occur within a ninety-day window and 
be approved by specific field agents and prosecutors). 
 305. See United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
public-authority defense must be tried to a jury and is not a basis for dismissal of an 
indictment). 
 306. See Rich, supra note 21, at 701 (asserting that the social positions of the 
informant and the officer translate to credibility decisions generally being made 
against the informant).  In addition to the public-authority and entrapment by 
estoppel defenses, courts have recognized that situations may arise where police 
involvement in criminal conduct is so outrageous that convicting a defendant for 
that conduct would violate due process.  See United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 
950 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the defense of outrageous government conduct may 
be used in extreme cases where “the government’s conduct violates fundamental 
fairness”).  The Due Process Clause is violated only where police conduct is 
“shocking to the universal sense of justice,” however.  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But see 
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the outrageous 
government conduct defense).  Given that no court has ever allowed a criminal 
informant to invoke the outrageous government conduct defense and the high 
standard of proof required to establish it, such application is unlikely in the future.  
See Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment and Due Process:  Moving Toward a Dual System of 
Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 505–06 (1998) (noting that the outrageous 
government conduct defense requires proof of “a significantly higher degree of 
government misconduct” than entrapment). 
 307. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ind. 1986) (ordering the 
dismissal of a case against a defendant as a result of a breach of a cooperation 
agreement by the prosecutor on public policy grounds); People v. Jackson, 480 
N.W.2d 283, 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the dismissal of charges against 
an informant who complied with agreement to provide information relating to a 
bank robbery in exchange for immunity); People v. Delaney, 436 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 
(App. Div. 1981) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment where the defendant 
established that he acted as an informant in an unrelated case upon a promise of 
leniency from law enforcement officials). 
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loathe interfering with that discretion.308  Meanwhile, oral 
cooperation agreements are difficult for criminal informants to 
prove, as the issue of their existence often comes down to a pitched 
battle of credibility between law enforcement agents and criminal 
informants.309  Finally, even if the informant can prove the existence 
of an agreement, law enforcement agents often do not have the 
authority to promise leniency, thus leaving open the possibility that 
such promises will prove to be unenforceable.310 
VI. PROTECTING ACTIVE CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that substantial informant 
interests in autonomy and safety are currently unprotected.  Society 
should protect many, but not all, of these interests in light of the 
valuable service that informants provide and the lack of responsibility 
that they often bear for their vulnerabilities.  This Part discusses 
policy proposals to protect those informant interests deserving of 
protection while considering the costs of such policies in terms of 
money, other resources, and harm to effective law enforcement, as 
well as their political feasibility. 
A. Providing Counsel to Potential Informants 
The most straightforward way to ensure that potential informants’ 
autonomy interests are protected would be to provide them an 
opportunity to consult with counsel while considering whether to 
cooperate with law enforcement.311  Defense counsel could remedy 
the information asymmetry between law enforcement and potential 
informants by guaranteeing that their clients are fully informed of 
the risks and potential benefits of cooperation.  They also could act as 
a check on unduly coercive law enforcement tactics and assess the 
capacity of their clients to cooperate effectively and safely.  And 
counsel could negotiate to ensure that cooperation agreements are 
set forth in writing and in terms that are enforceable; in doing so, 
they could provide their clients with the maximum possible 
protection from harm.  Finally, if such agreements are not honored 
by law enforcement, counsel could step in to compel compliance. 
                                                          
 308. Rich, supra note 21, at 700–01. 
 309. Id. at 701. 
 310. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in 
which law enforcement agents’ lack of authority resulted in the unavailability of 
immunity for the defendant). 
 311. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 183–84 (proposing that counsel should be 
made available to “uncharged suspects who are considering cooperation”). 
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This is not to say that the opportunity to consult with counsel 
would be a panacea.  Distrust of appointed counsel is endemic 
among criminals,312 and thus many potential informants may forego 
their chance to consult.  Moreover, in cases where cooperation is 
informal, there is no obvious place for an institutional check on 
whether the opportunity to consult was provided.313  Finally, the mere 
presence of defense counsel may make opportunities for arrestees to 
cooperate less available, thereby lessening their options.314  
Nevertheless, providing potential informants with the entitlement to 
counsel would provide substantial protection against threats to the 
autonomy and safety interests of informants. 
Practical problems with this proposal cast serious doubt on its 
feasibility, however.  From a political standpoint, opposition to 
providing counsel to criminal informants will be substantial, 
particularly from law enforcement officials who will argue that the 
involvement of counsel will hamper the informants’ effectiveness.315  
Even if such opposition could be overcome, any new entitlement to 
counsel is unlikely to be funded.  Currently, many jurisdictions do 
not allocate sufficient funds to allow for the provision of appointed 
counsel that satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.316  
Expanding the entitlement to counsel beyond the Sixth Amendment 
requirements will exacerbate this problem and swell public 
defenders’ already crushing caseloads.317  Thus, even if an entitlement 
                                                          
 312. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2478 (2004) (noting that when it comes to appointed counsel, “clients 
still believe the adage that you get what you pay for”). 
 313. This is to be distinguished from the plea bargaining context, where the plea 
colloquy provides some guarantee that the defendant at least had an opportunity to 
consult with counsel.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(D) (explaining that, in the plea 
context, the court must inform the defendant of the right to be represented by 
counsel). 
 314. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 184 (hypothesizing that the presence of 
counsel “might mean that fewer suspects would cooperate, and more might end up 
being charged with crimes”).  For instance, some defense attorneys are simply 
unwilling to represent informants.  See Richman, supra note 127, at 69–70 (providing 
an example of an attorney who generally did not represent clients in cooperation 
agreements with the government because he found such negotiations offensive). 
 315. See supra note 277 (discussing the opposition faced by a proposed law in 
Florida requiring that potential informants be provided the opportunity to consult 
with counsel). 
 316. See Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost:  Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 353–54 (explaining 
that the recent recession has resulted in billions of dollars worth of budget cuts, 
which has had a detrimental impact on funds allotted to indigent defense); Darryl K. 
Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements:  An Argument from Institutional Design, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004) (arguing that “[w]ithout [a] constitutional 
mandate, legislatures fail to provide adequately for criminal defense”). 
 317. See Baxter, supra note 316, at 355–58 (providing data on the staggering 
caseloads faced by public defenders). 
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to counsel for potential informants could be passed, it is unlikely that 
the vast majority of potential informants who are unable to pay for 
their own counsel would receive a level of representation that realizes 
the hoped-for benefits.318 
While at first blush, providing counsel to potential informants 
seems to be an ideal broad-brush remedy for many informant 
vulnerabilities, it is unlikely to be feasible.  Rather, more targeted 
proposals are needed. 
B. Court Approval for the Use of Particularly Vulnerable Informants 
As set forth above, certain classes of informants—minors, the 
mentally handicapped and mentally ill, and drug addicts—are 
particularly vulnerable to coercion and deserving of society’s 
protection.319  One might argue, then, that the easiest way to protect 
these informants would be to forbid their use entirely.320  But such a 
proposal throws out the baby with the bathwater.  Though 
particularly vulnerable to coercion, these individuals retain their 
autonomy interest in making their own choices to the fullest extent 
possible and with a minimum of government intervention.321  
Forbidding all members of these classes from becoming informants 
destroys that interest in the name of saving them.  That said, there 
doubtlessly are some members of these classes who are so vulnerable 
to coercion and so incapable of making informed and intelligent 
decisions that their autonomy interests cannot be protected by any 
informant use policy short of complete prohibition.322  Thus, a 
calibrated approach is needed. 
                                                          
 318. Meanwhile, the autonomy and safety interests of those who can afford to pay 
an attorney will receive greater protection.  Such a result will only aggravate the 
effect that a defendant’s financial resources have on criminal justice outcomes.  See 
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1789–90 (2001) 
(describing the lack of funding for indigent criminal defense and noting that “[o]nly 
defendants who have celebrated cases or can meet steep charges . . . have ready 
access to the highly skilled advocacy”). 
 319. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text (describing the susceptibility 
of minors, the mentally handicapped, and the mentally ill). 
 320. For instance, proposed informant use rules in Florida would have prohibited 
law enforcement from using as informants any individual currently in a drug 
treatment program.  See Portman, supra note 277, at 1A (describing how Florida’s 
informant law requires law enforcement to consider a potential informant’s age and 
maturity). 
 321. See Fallon, supra note 139, at 891 n.97 (noting how vulnerable classes such as 
minors and the mentally handicapped still possess some level of autonomy and 
associated “rights to personal sovereignty”). 
 322. Such a flat ban is analogous to regimes in the medical context that allow for 
surrogate decision-making for patients unable to give informed consent.  See generally 
Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making:  Defining the Best Interests of 
Never-Competent Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155 (2005) (describing the doctrine of parens 
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1. Juvenile informants 
California’s “Chad’s Law,” which governs the use of minor 
informants, sets forth such an approach by balancing these 
informants’ safety and autonomy interests.323  First, it provides 
maximum protection to the youngest juveniles by completely 
forbidding the use of informants who are twelve-years-old or 
younger.324  Second, it gives some assurance that an older juvenile’s 
decision is voluntary and intelligent by requiring that law 
enforcement disclose with the potential informant some crucial 
information, such as the potential benefit of cooperating and the 
sentence range that the juvenile might face if she does not inform.325  
Third, it lessens the risk that an innocent juvenile may be coerced 
into cooperating through empty law enforcement threats by 
requiring that a court find probable cause that the juvenile 
committed the crime for which she has been offered leniency before 
she can be used as an informant.326  Fourth, it diminishes the risk of 
involuntary cooperation by requiring a court to consider the specific 
characteristics of the juvenile, such as her age and maturity, and find 
that the juvenile’s decision to cooperate is voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.327  Finally, despite these protections, it preserves the core 
of the juvenile’s autonomy interest by not replacing the juvenile’s 
assessment of her best interests with a court’s.328  Other jurisdictions 
should adopt policies dictating similar procedures for the handling of 
juvenile informants.329 
                                                          
patriae, which in the medical context enables others to take over decision making for 
individuals that are not medically competent).  Unlike the medical context, however, 
where the issue of identifying the proper treatment can be complex, the risks to 
informants make it clear that those who are incapable of knowingly and voluntarily 
deciding to cooperate should be forbidden from doing so. 
 323. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 701.5 (West 2011) (setting forth California’s regulation 
of the use of minor informants, including certain conditions that must be met to 
permit use of such informants).  
 324. Id. § 701.5(a). 
 325. Id. § 701.5(d). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. § 701.5(c). 
 328. Rather, the statute permits only the potential informant’s parent or legal 
guardian to veto the juvenile’s decision to cooperate.  See id. § 701.5(d)(4).  This 
limited intrusion on the juvenile’s autonomy interest is necessary to vindicate the 
interest of parents in having control over the important decisions in their child’s life.  
See Darci G. Osther, Note, Juvenile Informants—A Necessary Evil?, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 
106, 125–26 (1999) (noting that a parent’s right to decide whether his or her child 
may serve as an informant is integral to the right to make child-rearing decisions and 
determine the best interests of his or her child). 
 329. This is not to say that Chad’s Law perfectly protects juvenile informants’ 
interests.  For instance, it requires the court to consider factors—such as the severity 
of the juvenile’s alleged offense and safety to the public—that are clearly irrelevant 
to the court’s determination of whether the juvenile’s decision to cooperate is 
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2. Mentally ill and mentally handicapped informants 
A similar approach should also be implemented for potential 
informants who are mentally ill or mentally handicapped.  The 
central inquiry in permitting their use should be whether the 
potential informant’s decision to cooperate is voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent.330  This inquiry should involve consideration of the 
specific characteristics of the informant and her situation and should 
be entrusted to a neutral decision-maker, such as a judge or 
magistrate, who is at least somewhat insulated from law enforcement 
pressures.331  Moreover, to ensure that the decision to cooperate is 
made intelligently, the decision-maker should be required to inform 
the vulnerable potential informant of the benefits of cooperation and 
the sentences she might face should she not cooperate.  Finally, the 
decision-maker should be obliged to find that probable cause exists 
to believe that the potential informant committed the crime for 
which leniency is promised before approving any cooperation 
agreement. 
Mental health issues present detection and line-drawing problems 
that are not present in the juvenile context, however.  Unlike age, 
which can be ascertained generally on sight and to a certainty with 
minimal investigation, mental health issues can be difficult for 
                                                          
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 701.5(c).  Other jurisdictions 
should not dictate such extraneous considerations. 
 330. The use of the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard is appropriate 
here, given the similarities between cooperation agreements and plea bargains.  In 
the plea bargaining context, the defendant’s guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent because it involves a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.  
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005).  Though the decision to cooperate 
does not involve a de jure waiver of constitutional rights, the cooperation agreement 
often supplants the formalized criminal justice system, particularly when an 
agreement is reached without the filing of formal charges.  The informant essentially 
concedes her guilt on the threatened charges and accepts the required cooperation 
as part of the appropriate punishment, obviously without a jury trial and usually 
without consultation with counsel.  See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text 
(discussing tactics employed by police officers, outside of the presence of a judge or 
counsel, to attempt to gain cooperation from an informant).  Thus, agreeing to 
cooperate involves a de facto waiver of these rights.  Of course, the informant may at 
any point stop cooperating, face criminal charges, and once again be entitled to the 
rights enjoyed by other criminal defendants.  Consequently, a cooperation 
agreement is not a legal waiver and all such agreements need not be tested under a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard.  But when concerns about coercion 
and lack of knowledge are heightened because of the vulnerabilities of the civilian at 
issue, the standard used to judge plea bargains is useful to address those concerns.  
Moreover, the familiarity of judges with this standard will allow them to apply it 
consistently in cooperation cases. 
 331. See supra notes 269–78 and accompanying text (describing the pressure on 
law enforcement agents to dispose of cases expeditiously and how this may translate 
into a lack of concern for the best interests of informants). 
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untrained laypersons to detect.332  Moreover, individuals with mental 
health issues often try to hide those issues out of embarrassment or 
fear.333  Meanwhile, law enforcement training on the identification 
and treatment of individuals with mental health issues is inconsistent 
across jurisdictions.334  Consequently, crafting a bright-line rule 
between those individuals with mental health issues who can 
voluntarily agree to cooperate and those who are unable to do so is 
impractical.335 
Rather, the only feasible approach is a flexible one that requires a 
closer examination of those potential informants who are at risk of 
acting involuntarily or unknowingly as a result of mental illness or 
retardation.  With this in mind, law enforcement agents should be 
required to seek court approval for the use of any informant whom 
they reasonably believe may suffer from mental illness or mental 
retardation that substantially impacts her ability to agree to cooperate 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.  Once alerted to law 
enforcement concerns, a neutral magistrate should then be 
empowered to engage in fact-finding that might include a discussion 
with the potential informant and consultation with psychologists or 
social workers with mental health experience.  Ultimately, law 
enforcement should use an individual as an informant only if the 
court determines that the informant can agree to cooperate 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. 
Requiring law enforcement to refer to the court all potential 
informants about whom they have substantial concerns is easier for 
untrained law enforcement than applying a bright-line rule.  But for 
                                                          
 332. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence:  Severe 
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 822–23 (2009). 
 333. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 430–31 (1985). 
 334. See Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race:  Policing Race and 
Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2010) (noting that police receive little 
training on how to deal with mentally impaired defendants); Natalie Pifer, Note, Is 
Life the Same as Death?:  Implications of Graham v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and 
Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally Retarded 
Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495, 1527–28 (2010) (explaining that few states’ 
police departments have training programs on the special challenges posed by 
mentally handicapped defendants).  This is true even though a substantial 
percentage of criminals suffer from mental health issues of some kind.  See America’s 
Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 
2399, 2399 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 379ii) (reporting data from a Bureau of 
Justice Statistics report that sixteen percent of inmates in state prisons and local jails 
suffer from mental illness). 
 335. Of course, there will be some potential informants whose mental health 
issues clearly preclude them from being effective informants.  Given law enforcement 
interests in effectiveness and efficiency, there is no need for a rule making such 
individuals ineligible to cooperate. 
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it to be effective, it requires “buy-in” from agents:  if they believe that 
court review is merely an impediment to law enforcement, they will 
avoid it in all but the most obvious cases and thus undermine the 
goals of the reform.  For this reason, law enforcement agents also 
must be trained to recognize that their interest in obtaining arrests 
and convictions converges with society’s interest in protecting the 
mentally ill and mentally handicapped.336 
Specifically, the same issues that interfere with the capacity of a 
potential informant to cooperate knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily also impact her ability to be a useful informant.  For 
instance, a potential informant who is vulnerable to coercion due to 
mental illness or handicap also would be more likely to fabricate 
information to gain the approval of law enforcement.337  Similarly, 
delusional or paranoid informants are likely to provide useless 
information as they may have difficulty distinguishing fantasy from 
reality.338  Helping law enforcement recognize that their interests are 
synchronous with society’s will foster the realization that the court’s 
involvement is not merely a roadblock to an effective investigation 
and enhance compliance. 
3. Drug-addicted informants 
Drug-addicted informants present similar challenges.  Police 
training on the detection of drug addiction and drug use is 
inconsistent.339  And addicts have strong incentives to keep their 
addiction a secret, including the desire to cooperate to “work off” 
any charges and remain out of jail.  Nevertheless, drug addicts are 
well-known by law enforcement to be unreliable informants.340  Thus, 
                                                          
 336. An alternative, or perhaps additional, reform might impose some sort of 
sanction on those agents who fail to comply with the requirement of court review.  I 
do not advocate for this proposal, however, because sanctions on the police are often 
politically unfeasible and under-enforced. 
 337. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:  Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 21 (2010) (noting the tendency of the 
mentally handicapped to desire to please persons in positions of authority); Allison 
D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders 
with Mental Illness, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 81–82 (2010) (observing how inherent 
vulnerabilities put individuals with mental illness at an especially high risk of making 
a false confession). 
 338. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 189 (“Someone who is paranoid and 
delusional about imagined plots or contrived schemes is not going to be a very 
successful informant.”). 
 339. See Joseph Osmond, Note, The Plight of the Unsuspected Drug User:  A Police 
Officer’s Take on Arizona v. Gant, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1257, 1273 (2010) (discussing 
the cost and infrequency of training police in drug use recognition). 
 340. See MADINGER, supra note 1, at 187–88 (discussing the unreliability of 
addicted informants); MALLORY, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that many jurisdictions 
recognize that drug-addicted informants are less reliable). 
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society’s interests again align with those of law enforcement, and the 
approach to handling drug-addicted informants should be similar to 
that of the mentally ill.  Namely, the police should be required to 
obtain court approval before using any informant whom they 
reasonably believe suffers from a drug addiction that substantially 
impacts her ability to agree to cooperate intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily.  Similarly, training should again be used to reinforce the 
synchronicity between law enforcement’s interest in accurate arrests 
and convictions and society’s interest in protecting addicts. 
C. Remedying Information Asymmetries 
As discussed above, all criminal informants are vulnerable to 
coercion due to information asymmetries not of their own making.  
Specifically, they are unable to evaluate the claims made by law 
enforcement agents about the potential charges and sentences they 
might face if they do not cooperate and the potential benefits they 
might receive by cooperating.  Furthermore, they cannot evaluate the 
enforceability of the promises made by law enforcement.341 
One potential solution to these information asymmetries would be 
to expand the previous proposal and require court involvement in 
the use of any informant.342  Doing so would remedy the information 
asymmetries at issue.  On the other hand, given the sheer number of 
informants used by law enforcement, it also would almost certainly 
overburden the court system.  Moreover, increasing the number of 
individuals who know the identity of a potential informant would 
increase the possibility that her cooperation would become known, 
thus endangering the informant. 
A more moderate step would be to require consent from the 
relevant prosecutor’s office prior to the use of any criminal 
informant.  Specifically, a representative of the relevant prosecutor’s 
office with authority to bind the office would assess the case against 
the potential informant, provide a non-binding determination of the 
charges she might face and the sentence she could receive, and 
commit the office to providing a specified benefit should the 
                                                          
 341. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text (describing how law 
enforcement officers may make promises to informants without authority, and how 
informants lack access to the information needed to evaluate such promises). 
 342. Another possible solution would be to require police to tell potential 
informants the truth.   Though attractive in its simplicity, such a requirement would 
run contrary to police practice and recent precedent, which permit and even 
condone police lying to suspected criminals.  See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil:  
Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 427–32, 451–56 (1996) (describing 
the types of lies police tell to coerce informants and detailing evidence of judicial 
tolerance for police deception). 
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individual agree to cooperate.  The results of the prosecutor’s 
assessment would be reduced to writing and shared with the potential 
informant. 
The benefits of this requirement from the standpoint of protecting 
the informant are obvious:  the potential informant would no longer 
be forced to rely on police assertions about her guilt and the possible 
sentence she might face; instead, she would receive an enforceable, 
written promise of a benefit from the relevant prosecutor should she 
cooperate.343  This procedure would also minimize the risk that the 
informant’s identity might be disclosed, and the informant’s safety 
thus compromised, by limiting disclosure of the informant’s identity 
to the recruiting officer and a single member of the prosecutor’s 
office designated for this task. 
Moreover, the procedure is not unduly burdensome on police or 
prosecutors.  While the proposal does deprive individual officers of 
the discretion to recruit informants without outside interference, law 
enforcement experts on informant recruitment and handling do not 
condone unfettered discretion and already recommend that 
informant recruitment be subject to supervisory approval.344  
Meanwhile, determining the existence of probable cause is a routine 
task for a prosecutor who often must assess the validity of arrests and 
the prospects of winning cases at trial.  Similarly, the task of making a 
non-binding assessment of the sentence that an arrestee might face is 
part and parcel of the plea bargaining process.  Of course, requiring 
prosecutors to make a binding promise to a potential informant will 
impose costs on society as those promises are then enforced, but such 
is the price that society must pay to vindicate the autonomy of its 
members. 
D. Training Police and Informants to Minimize Risk 
The safety interests of informants can best be protected through 
better training of both police and informants.  Often, harm to 
informants can be traced back to inadequate training of police, 
either in how to safeguard the identity of informants or in how to 
                                                          
 343. Though the prosecutor’s assessment of the possible charges and sentence 
that the informant might face if she chooses not to cooperate would be non-binding, 
the prosecutor would be constrained to be honest in her assessment by her narrow 
obligation as an attorney not to lie to third-parties, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2010), and her more general duty as a prosecutor to truth, see 
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 
313–14 (2001) (arguing that a prosecutor has a “legal and ethical duty to promote 
truth” and describing the scope of that duty). 
 344. See MALLORY, supra note 1, at 113 (describing how supervisory approval and 
consultation with legal counsel is required prior to working with an informant). 
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plan operations so as to provide the maximum possible protection to 
the informants who are involved.345  Police officers, particularly those 
involved in areas of law enforcement in which the use of informants 
is common, should receive additional training so as to minimize 
unnecessary risks to informant safety. 
Informants also receive little or no training in how to handle 
potentially dangerous situations.346  The threat of criminal sanctions 
should they fail to satisfy their police handlers often causes 
informants to remain in a dangerous situation longer than is wise.  
To counteract this incentive, informants should receive at least 
rudimentary training in how to recognize when they are in a 
dangerous situation and how to remove themselves before they are 
harmed.  Moreover, police should be instructed not to punish 
informants who exit dangerous situations prior to obtaining the 
evidence sought. 
E. Including Informants in Existing Workers’ Compensation Schemes 
Even with better training for police and informants, police still will 
have substantial discretion in their use of informants.  This discretion 
will be exercised in manner responsive to internal and external 
pressures to maximize arrests and convictions.347  These pressures, 
combined with the generally dim view of criminal informants held by 
law enforcement, suggest that police will inevitably sacrifice 
informant safety for the opportunity to increase arrest and 
convictions rates.  Incentives are therefore needed to encourage 
police to protect informant safety.  Such incentives would most 
reasonably take the form of some combination of internal law 
enforcement regulations and the potential for external sanctions.  
Unfortunately, internal regulations relating to informants have 
proven to be ineffective at shaping police conduct with respect to 
informants.348 
                                                          
 345. See, e.g., ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 33 (finding that approximately sixty-
three percent of surveyed officers reported receiving no training in the handing of 
informants); John Riley, Expert:  Cops Put His Life in Danger, NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 2011, 
at A41 (reporting, in the case of two officers sued for negligently revealing the 
identity of an informant who later was killed, that the officers received no formal 
training in how to handle and protect confidential informants). 
 346. See, e.g., Hoffman’s Attorneys Release Statement Critical of TPD, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT, May 11, 2008, at 6A (reporting that an informant killed during an 
arranged drug deal received no training from police). 
 347. See supra notes 269–73 and accompanying text (describing the institutional 
job pressures, such as clearance rates, that cause law enforcement officers to 
increasingly rely on informants). 
 348. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting that the national law 
enforcement agency, the FBI, has been criticized for failing to follow the DOJ 
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This leaves external sanctions as the most practical means of 
deterring police from unnecessarily endangering informants.  But 
what form should these sanctions take?  The consensus among 
criminologists is that the certainty of punishment is the most critical 
factor in deterring misconduct.349  This being so, the current threat of 
external sanctions is unlikely to deter police from unduly 
endangering informant interests because the possibility of recovery 
under a tort theory depends largely on the informant’s ability to 
establish egregious misconduct; as a result, damages are awarded only 
in the most exceptional cases.350  Such uncertainty in the imposition 
of sanctions against police, even if the sanctions themselves are 
severe, deters very little misconduct.351  While lowering the standard 
for civil liability would provide greater certainty of punishment, and 
thus greater deterrence, doing so would require either a wholesale 
change in substantive due process jurisprudence or the political will 
to open law enforcement to substantial civil liability.352  To be frank, 
neither seems particularly likely. 
Workers’ compensation, however, already provides a regime by 
which individuals who are injured while working are awarded a set, 
modest compensation regardless of fault.353  The theory is 
straightforward:  workers’ compensation benefits employees by 
providing a streamlined, efficient way for them to recover for injuries 
relating to their employment, while employers benefit from lower 
and certain damages awards.354  As a legislative matter, extending 
workers’ compensation benefits to criminal informants would require 
only the amendment of the definition of “employee” in the relevant 
states to include informants whose services are provided in exchange 
for a promise of leniency from law enforcement.355 
                                                          
Guidelines intended to enhance the safety and protections afforded to informants). 
 349. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Not the Crime but the Cover-Up:  A Deterrence-
Based Rationale for the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula, 86 IND. L.J. 879, 907 (2011). 
 350. See supra notes 281–99 and accompanying text (discussing the significant 
legal hurdles facing the plaintiff in a civil suit against law enforcement). 
 351. See Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 
713, 717 (2008) (describing the theory that “moderate but certain punishment 
deters more effectively than severe but uncertain punishment”). 
 352. In the rare cases where informant claims survive, jury awards tend to be large.  
See, e.g., Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(amending an award of $70 million in compensatory damages and $27 million in 
punitive damages to a total award of just over $1 million in a case where the 
informant was murdered while attempting a drug purchase). 
 353. Workers’ compensation schemes exist in every jurisdiction.  Jason M. 
Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 332 (2010). 
 354. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ 
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800–01 (1982). 
 355. Narrow tailoring the definition of “employee” already is the rule in workers’ 
compensation statutes.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.02(15) (2011) (setting out explicit 
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For the purposes of deterring police from taking unnecessary risks 
with informant safety, workers’ compensation is an excellent fit.  The 
cost to law enforcement agencies of obtaining workers’ compensation 
insurance for informants would depend upon the number of 
informants they employ and their track record of past injuries.356  As a 
result, law enforcement agencies would be incentivized to minimize 
the risk of physical harm to informants.357  Because the increased 
costs would apply agency-wide, so too would reforms of informant 
policies, thus widening the scope of reforms to an extent unlikely 
with substantial but scattershot jury awards.  Finally, this approach 
properly places the incentive and responsibility for reform on law 
enforcement agencies, which are most capable of formulating 
effective policies. 
One additional point is worth noting.  Folding criminal informants 
into existing workers’ compensation schemes will do little to deter 
the most flagrant police misconduct that threatens the safety of 
informants.358  By allowing certain low-level recovery for harms 
suffered by informants, the workers’ compensation scheme will 
encourage law enforcement agencies to adopt policies that impose 
low-cost limitations on the most dangerous practices.  These policies 
are likely to influence officers who tend to follow the rules, but are 
unlikely to deter extremely reckless or intentional endangerment of 
informants, activities which typically are already forbidden.  Many 
states do exclude from workers’ compensation schemes intentional 
torts by the employer,359 but these exceptions are construed narrowly 
and often require a finding of actual intent to harm by the 
employer.360  Even if egregious law enforcement misconduct were 
excluded from the workers’ compensation scheme, the informant 
would be left to rely on uncertain tort recovery.361  The inability of this 
                                                          
definitions of the term “employee,” including what conduct the term does not 
encompass); MICH. COMP. LAWS . § 418.161 (2011) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) 
(2011) (same). 
 356. See 9 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
LAW § 150.06 (2011) (noting that workman’s insurance rates are calculated based on 
the number of employees who receive compensation). 
 357. Agencies also may decide to use fewer informants.  While this would harm 
the interest of potential informants in avoiding punishment, that is not an interest 
that society ought to protect.  See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text 
(discussing the harm to society incident to an informant’s desire to avoid 
punishment). 
 358. See Epstein, supra note 354, at 814 (“Unlike ordinary negligence, intentional 
harms introduce an element of moral hazard that is very difficult to control by a set 
of rules designed for accidents.”). 
 359. 6 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 356, § 103.01. 
 360. Id. § 103.03. 
 361. See supra notes 281–99 and accompanying text (discussing the legal hurdles 
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solution to deter the worst misconduct should not be fatal to the 
plan, however.  Rather, it is part of a larger struggle to ultimately 
deter such wrongdoing. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion has attempted to remedy the oversight of 
scholars who have largely ignored the interests of informants by 
focusing on those interests exclusively.  But informant interests do 
not exist in a vacuum, and obvious questions arise from such a single-
minded focus.  Among them, one might well ask why, in an era of 
limited government resources, should resources be devoted to 
protecting the interests of active criminal informants?  More 
specifically, why should protecting these informants be prioritized 
over other pressing law enforcement concerns? 
Answering these questions, important as they are, exceeds the 
scope of this Article.  However, it is worth noting that the proposals 
made herein would address, at least in part, many of the concerns 
raised by scholars about the broader societal implications of 
widespread informant use.  For instance, scholars have argued that 
informant use negatively impacts policing by allowing investigations 
to be driven by informants rather than law enforcement agents.362  
Similarly, regular interaction with informants can lead to police 
corruption.363  Both of these problems would be curtailed at least 
somewhat by requiring prosecutorial involvement in the recruitment 
of informants. 
The use of informants also can have corrosive effects on the high-
crime communities in which they are most often used and the 
relationship between the police and those communities.  Releasing 
criminals to inform on their neighbors’ activities weakens social ties, 
increases crime, and communicates to members of high-crime 
communities that crime in those communities will not be punished.364  
Moreover, civilians often view the recruitment and use of informants 
as coercive and exploitative.365  These concerns, in turn, give rise to 
civilian distrust of police, a reduced willingness by law-abiding citizens 
                                                          
that impede and generally prevent an informant from recovery against law 
enforcement in a civil suit). 
 362. See NATAPOFF, supra note 13, at 32–33 (describing the ways in which the use of 
informants “flips the law enforcement endeavor on its head”). 
 363. Id. at 32. 
 364. See Natapoff, supra note 16, at 691–92 (describing how a culture of informing 
can breed distrust and fear in communities, breaking down social ties and 
relationships). 
 365. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 1, at 52–55 (describing the types of corrupt 
practices employed by law enforcement in recruiting informants). 
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to cooperate, and an adversarial relationship between law 
enforcement and the communities they are meant to serve.366  By 
slightly increasing the transaction costs involved in recruiting a new 
informant, the proposals contained herein will reduce the number of 
informants used and thus ameliorate the sense that informants are 
infiltrating high-crime communities.  In addition, restrictions on the 
use of particularly vulnerable informants and guarantees that 
informants must agree to cooperate knowingly and voluntarily will 
counter the impression that police agents exploit informants.  The 
ultimate result would hopefully be an increase in trust and 
cooperation between law enforcement and communities. 
Finally, the use of informants may ultimately undermine the 
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions if the perceived benefits of 
cooperation to the criminal outweigh the increased risk that an 
informant will detect their crimes.367  The obvious solution to this 
problem is to reduce the rate at which informants are recruited, but 
such reforms are unlikely to be implemented internally by law 
enforcement.368  Once again, by increasing the transaction cost of 
informant recruitment, the proposals set forth herein would require 
law enforcement to enact such a reduction. 
But these answers to the question of why we should protect 
informants allow society to do the right thing for the wrong reasons.  
Ultimately, society should protect informants because informants are 
vulnerable members of society meriting protection according to 
widely-accepted norms.  Often their vulnerabilities are unchosen, and 
some arise from their decision to engage in activities that benefit 
society.  This compels society’s protection. 
                                                          
 366. See Rich, supra note 12 (manuscript at 20) (explaining how the origins of the 
“Stop Snitching” movement are rooted in racism in policing and the negative 
experiences with law enforcement common to many residents of high-crime 
communities). 
 367. See Baer, supra note 129, at 963 (explaining that, if criminals presume they 
will be able to reduce consequences through cooperation, they will be more willing 
to commit crimes). 
 368. See id. at 964 (noting how law enforcement agencies will be unlikely to reduce 
the use of informants where such use “impact[s] all-important conviction and arrest 
statistics, which are the source of resources and prestige”). 
